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INTRODUCTION
On January 3, 1999, a young woman named Kendra Webdale was
tragically pushed to her death in front of an oncoming Manhattan
subway train by twenty-nine-year-old Andrew Goldstein, a diagnosed
schizophrenic with a history of violence who failed to take his pre-
scribed medication.! Other similarly tragic incidents occurred that
year, including the April 6 police shooting of Charles Stevens, a man
with a history of mental illness who swung a sword at passengers on
the Long Island Railroad.2 In another instance, on April 28, 1999,
Edgar Rivera's legs were severed after Julio Perez, an untreated
schizophrenic, shoved him into an oncoming subway train.3
In response to these tragedies, New York's Attorney General, Eliot
Spitzer, proposed Assisted Outpatient Treatment ("AOT") legislation,
which is the official name for Kendra's Law.1 On August 27, 1999,
New York Governor George Pataki formally signed this legislation,
named in honor of Kendra Webdale, into law.' This statute allows
particular individuals to petition the court to obtain an order for a
mentally ill person to receive AOT if that person meets very specific
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Id.
See Eliot Spitzer, Is Kendra's Law the Answer? YES, N.Y. L.J., May 19, 1999, at 2 (an-
nouncing the proposal and emphasizing its merits).
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and defined criteria. 6
This Comment analyzes New York's approach to assisted outpa-
tient commitment. Part I first provides a brief history of outpatient
commitment in the United States and explains the legal foundation
that allows a state legally to provide such an option for mentally ill in-
dividuals. Second, other states' statutory approaches to AOT are ex-
amined. Part II provides a detailed discussion of the way Kendra's
Law will operate in New York, and a federal- and state-level constitu-
tional evaluation and analysis follows. Part III provides policyjustifica-
tions for, and potential barriers to, implementing Kendra's Law. Fi-
nally, Part IV discusses recent developments and cases arising under
the statute.
This Comment argues that through Kendra's Law, New York has
provided a less restrictive alternative than inpatient commitment for
treating the mentally ill. Balancing the patient's liberty and autonomy
6 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c) (McKinney Supp. 2001). The statute sets out
the necessary criteria for an AOT court order.
A patient may be ordered to obtain assisted outpatient treatment if the court
finds that:
(1) the patient is eighteen years of age or older, and
(2) the patient is suffering from a mental illness; and
(3) the patient is unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervi-
sion, based on a clinical determination; and
(4) the patient has a history of lack of compliance with treatment for mental
illness that has:
(i) at least twice within the last thirty-six months been a significant factor in
necessitating hospitalization in a hospital, or receipt of services in a forensic
or other mental health unit of a correctional facility or a local correctional fa-
cility, not including any period during which the person was hospitalized or
incarcerated immediately preceding the filing of the petition or, [sic]
(ii) resulted in one or more acts of serious violent behavior toward self or
others or threats of, or attempts at, serious physical harm to self or others
within the last forty-eight months, not including any period in which the per-
son was hospitalized or incarcerated immediately preceding the filing of the
petition; and
(5) the patient is, as a result of his or her mental illness, unlikely to voluntar-
ily participate in the recommended treatment pursuant to the treatment plan;
and
(6) in view of the patient's treatment history and current behavior, the pa-
dent is in need of assisted outpatient treatment in order to prevent a relapse
or deterioration which would be likely to result in serious harm to the patient
or others as defined in section 9.01 of this article; and
(7) it is likely that the patient will benefit from assisted outpatient treatment;
and
(8) if the patient has executed a health care proxy as defined in article 29-C
of the public health law, that any directions included in such a proxy shall be
taken into account by the court in determining the written treatment plan.
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interests against the State's police power and parens patriae interests
leads to the conclusion that the State's interests outweigh the patient's
interests. Under this analysis, Kendra's Law does not violate substan-
tive due process. Furthermore, the procedural safeguards that are
built into the statute lessen the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation
of liberty. Ironically, Kendra's Law actually increases a patient's lib-
erty in a system where the only alternatives would be either inpatient
commitment or physical freedom subject to the mental imprisonment
caused by the illness. Critics' central argument against the statute is
that it violates a patient's right to determine her own course of treat-
ment; however, Kendra's Law permits the patient to participate in the
development of a treatment plan. Furthermore, it does not authorize
involuntary medication, thereby upholding the state constitutional
and common law right to refuse treatment. Finally, the most serious
potential barrier to the successful implementation of Kendra's Law
would be lack of adequate funding. It is uncertain at this time
whether the budgetary provisions made for Kendra's Law will prove
sufficient to carry out its objectives. The option for AOT is meaning-
less unless the resources are available to implement it.
Kendra's Law is crucial to preventing tragedies, such as the Ken-
dra Webdale incident, from occurring again. An estimated one thou-
sand homicides are committed each year by untreated mentally ill in-
dividuals.7 In addition, the suicide rate among the mentally ill is ten
to fifteen times higher than among the general population." Fifty
percent of mentally ill individuals suffer from a symptom called "lack
of insight," which causes the person not to recognize her illness and,
therefore, to refuse to take the medication necessary to treat it.9
7 Set E. Fuller Torrey & Mary T. Zdanowicz, Hope for Cities Dealing with the Mental
Illness Crisis, NATION'S CITIES WKLY., Apr. 19, 1999, at 2 (discussing societal implica-
tions arising from mental illness).
'Id.
The majority of patients who lack insight, awareness or consciousness of
their disease, are indifferent to it and reject the need for treatment. ... Thus,
the patient will deny haxing any disease, refuse to acknowledge any symptom,
and feel it is appropriate to refuse treatment. Indeed, this usually manifests it-
self as belligerency towards both the treatment and the indidual supplying
the treatment. This belligerency manifests itself in the dilemma that persons
who do not know of their illness cannot adequately make the decision to ref-
use treatment, thereby affecting any possibility of restoring their decision mak-
ing ability.... Impaired insight is the single most important reason why the
mentally ill do not take medications regularly and is thus the most important
cause of relapse.
Paul F. Stais, The Nexum: A Modest Proposal for Self-Guardianship by Contract: A System of
Advane Directives and Surrogate Committees-at-Large for the Intermittently Mentally 1l4 16 J.
183
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Proper implementation of Kendra's Law will target such individuals
and treat them before their illness results in tragedy to themselves or
others.
The need for a law such as Kendra's Law is evidenced by the
ironic fact that Andrew Goldstein had twice attempted voluntarily to
participate in the Bellevue Pilot Program (the precursor to Kendra's
Law), but was turned away.' ° Although a law such as Kendra's Law
would not have helped in the specific case of Andrew Goldstein, who
had sought help on his own but was rejected due to lack of space at
mental health facilities," it would be a good place to start improving
the lives of the mentally ill, as well as the public safety.
I. SURVEY OF OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT
A. Background of Outpatient Commitment
AOT has developed as the direct result of deinstitutionalization in
the United States.' 2 The deinstitutionalization movement began in
1955, when the first effective antipsychotic medication-chlorpromaz-
ine, or Thorazine-was introduced. 13 The states were financially re-
sponsible for patients while they were in state hospitals, but were able
to shift the burden to the federal government by discharging them.
Medicaid was enacted in 1965, and the federal government specifically
excluded Medicaid payments for patients in state psychiatric hospitals
and other "institutions for the treatment of mental diseases"
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 21-22 (1999) (citations omitted); see also infra notes
225-26 and accompanying text (explaining the theoretical justifications for such legis-
lation in terms of the necessities of "lack of insight").
I0 Michael Winerip, Behind One Man's Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1999, § 4, at 3.
11 See Dateline NBC: Deadly Encounter, Murder of Kendra Webdale and Trial of Her Killer,
Andrew Goldstein (NBC television broadcast, July 16, 2000), LEXIS, NBC News File
("Repeatedly, our investigation found that he asked to live in a group home or psychi-
atric hospital, someplace where he would be watched. But each time, the hospitals dis-
charged Goldstein after a few days or weeks at most."). Hospitals were under pressure
to release Goldstein, as, "[i]n the new world of managed care, insurance payments for
schizophrenics only stay at maximum levels for about three weeks or until the patient
is stabilized, then the compensation goes down dramatically." Id.
12 See, e.g., E. Fuller Torrey & RobertJ. Kaplan, A National Survey of the Use of Outpa-
tient Commitmen 46 PSYCHIATRIC SERvIcEs 778, 778 (1995) (reviewing the extent of
outpatient commitment in the United States).
See Treatment Advocacy Center, Homelessness, Incarceration, Episodes of Violence:
Way of Life for Almost Half of Americans with Untreated Severe Mental Illness, at
http://vv.psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/fact2.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2001)
(recounting the history of deinstitutionalization).
14 Id.
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("IMDs").'5 The purposes of excluding the payments were both to fos-
ter deinstitutionalization and to shift costs back to the states, where
the federal government considered the responsibility to lie.!3 In re-
sponse, the states transferred massive numbers of patients to nursing
homes and to the community, where Medicaid reimbursement was
available.' As a result of the incentives created by Medicaid programs,
more than ninety percent of state psychiatric hospital beds have been
eliminated since 1960 and an estimated forty-four psychiatric hospitals
closed nationwide in the 1990s.'*
Another explanation for the deinstitutionalization movement is
"the inadequacy of treatment in most public mental hospitals."'
Many of these facilities were overcrowded, physically decayed, under-
staffed, and had limited or nonexistent psychotherapy." The com-
munity treatment approach was also
motivated by the clinical recognition that institutional existence tends to
foster passive and dependent behavior.... [This] approach recognizes
the drawbacks of segregating the mentally ill from the rest of society, and
instead seeks to assist patients in developing or maintaining their "basic
social capacities" and to foster independence and initiative.
The 1960s deinstitutionalization movement was also motivated by
a concern for the civil rights of patients, signified by the creation of
more stringent standards for civil commitment and by procedural and
substantive due process safeguards, such as the right to treatment in
the least restrictive environment. 2 The doctrine of the least restrictive
alternative (or least restrictive environment or setting) refers to
treatment in a setting that preserves the individual's freedom and
' Id. "IMDs were defined by the federal government as institutions or residences
in which more than 16 individuals reside, at least half of who [sic] have a primary psy-
chiatric diagnosis." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
J. Id.
17 Id.
is See id. (stating that in 1955 there were 559,000 patients with serious brain disor-
ders in state psychiatric hospitals, compared with less than 70,000 today).I. ValerieJ. Wilkinson, Comment, 1986 Amendments to Georgia's Mental Health Stat-
utes: The Latest Attempt To Provide a Solution to the Problem of the Chronically Mentally X, 36
EMoRYL.J. 1313, 1320 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 1320-21 (footnotes omitted).
See Antony B. Mapper, Comment, Finding a Right in State Constitutions for Commu-
nity Treatment of the Mentally I4 142 U. PA. L. REV. 739, 751 (1993) (noting that in the
1960s states began to "enact new laws to protect the liberty interests of the mentally
ill").
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autonomy to the greatest extent possible.23
The goals of the deinstitutionalization movement were to provide
a continuum of community-based services for the mentally ill, with
minimal use of institutionalized care, as well as to furnish treatment in
the least restrictive settings and utilize preventive mental health care.4
These goals, however, have not been fully realized. Many chronically
ill individuals do not receive treatment and, as a result, "have become
homeless or.... 'transinstitutionalized' into nursing homes, prisons,
and jails." 5 According to two prominent commentators in the field,
Dr. E. Fuller Torrey and attorney Mary Zdanowicz, a pattern of vio-
lence among the mentally ill is the result of deinstitutionalization
"gone awry:"
The emerging pattern of violence is clear. And it is part of a larger pat-
tern: increasing numbers of severely mentally ill individuals among the
homeless population, incarcerated in jails and prisons for offenses
23 See THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH 44 (1978) (stating that the
objective of the least restrictive alternative doctrine is to "maintain[] the greatest de-
gree of freedom, self-determination, autonomy, dignity, and integrity of body, mind,
and spirit for the individual while he or she participates in treatment or receives sen-
ices"). For cases interpreting this concept, see Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 655-56 (5th
Cir. 1980) (requiring the possibility and type of violence, the likely effects of the drugs
on the individual, and the possibility of less restrictive alternatives to be balanced be-
fore anti-psychotic drugs can be forcibly administered); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d
617 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (identifying the maximum security ward as the most restrictive
treatment setting in a hospital); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en
banc) (considering the location of treatment); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439,
462 (S.D. Iowa 1976) (holding full-time hospitalization to be more restrictive than use
of outpatient facilities); Lessard v. Schmid4 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
(finding community treatment programs less restrictive than institutionalization); In re
Farrow, 255 S.E. 2d 777, 781-82 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that involuntary commit-
ment is more restrictive than voluntary commitment). Treatment must be appropriate
and effective for the patient, however, and the least restrictive alternative may not al-
ways be best. See, e.g., Leona L. Bachrach, Is the Least Restrictive Environment Always the
Best? Sociological and Semantic Implications, 31 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 97, 100
(1980) (defining restrictiveness as not necessarily correlated with the degree of inde-
pendent living, but rather dependent upon various environmental factors, such as lo-
cation, degree of autonomy, and treatment provided); Thomas G. Gutheil et al., The
Inappropriateness of "Least Restrictive Alternative" Analysis for Involuntary Procedures with the
Institutionalized Mentally X 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 7, 12 (1983) (urging consideration of
the effectiveness of the alternatives in determining which are least restrictive in a par-
ticular case). Kendra's Law requires that AOT be the least restrictive alternative. See
Kendra's Law: The Process for Obtaining Assisted Outpatient Treatment, OMH Q, Dec. 1999,
at 4, 6 [hereinafter Kendra 's Law: The Process].
24 SeeJilliane T. Hinds, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment for the Chronically Mentally
Ill, 69 NEB. L. REv. 346, 347 (1990).
25 Id. at 349 (citation omitted).
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committed while psychotic, and loitering in parks, public libraries and
transportation stations. The pattern is the product of deinstitutionaliza-
tion gone awry, the discharge of hundreds of thousands of mentally ill
individuals from the nation's public psychiatric hospitals without ensur-
ing that the), get the medication they need to remain well. 
2
This pattern of violence is real. By one estimate, mentally ill peo-
ple commit about 1000 homicides a year, or about 5% of total na-
tional homicides annually. 7 Furthermore, about 20% of the 2.3 mil-
lion adult Americans who suffer from bipolar disorder, also known as
manic depression, and about 10% of the 2 million adult American
schizophrenics commit suicide each year.'8 States have responded to
this crisis in one of three ways-conditional release, outpatient com-
mitment as a dispositional alternative, and preventive commitment.'
B. Legal Foundation for Deinstitutionalization and
Outpatient Commitment
States derive their authority to order outpatient commitment from
the police power or from the parens patriae power.&o The police power
justification rests on the theory that the State may enact laws to pro-
tect the public health, safety, and general welfare. 3' The parens patriae
E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz, 117y Denstitutionalization Turned Deadly,
WALLST.J., Aug. 4, 1998, at A18.
John Gibeaut, Ii0to Knows Best?, A.B.A.J.,Jan. 2000, at 49, 52.
Id. at 50.
,e Gerry McCafferty & Jeanne Dooley, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment. An
Update, 14 MENTAL & PHwsIcAL DIsABILrr L. REP. 277, 279-282 (1990) (stating that
many states have incorporated one or more of these three responses into their stat-
utes). Under conditional release, the treatment facility or the attending physician
generally establishes the terms of release from the hospital, and failure to comply may
result in rehospitalization. See id. at 279 (outlining the general provisions of condi-
tional release programs). "[O]utpatient commitment as a [dispositional alternative is
a] less restrictive alternative to hospitalization[] [a]fter a finding of mental illness and
dangerousness to self or others .... " Id. at 279-80 (footnote omitted). Under preven-
tive commitment, "courts have the... [discretion] to commit an individual who is not
currently dangerous, but who... [may become] dangerous without treatment." Id. at
281. Another mechanism that is used is conservatorship-guardianship, whereby a third
part, appointed by the court is given authority to consent to outpatient treatment on
behalf of the patient, based on the notion of substituted consent. See Torrey & Kaplan,
supra note 12, at 779 (comparing conservator-guardianship with outpatient commit-
ment programs); see also infra Part I.C (discussing various states' approaches).
See SX\MUELJAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MIENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 24 (3d
ed. 1985).
'I To commit the noncriminal mentally ill under the police power, most states re-
quire a showing by clear and convincing proof that, as a result of the individual's men-
tal illness: (1) the individual is unable to comply with the law or conform to the limits
187
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rationale empowers the State to protect those who cannot protect
themselves." Often the State's intervention is an extension of the po-
lice power or the parens patriae power because it is exercised in antici-
pation of future harm, rather than in response to an "'immediate threat
to life or property. "'3 This is true of Kendra's Law, which provides for
AOT even if no act of violence has occurred, but where there is a like-
lihood of such an act occurring. 4
Although the realm of mental health care is left to the states, the
Constitution and the Supreme Court provide a minimal level of pro-
tection to the mentally ill. In 1975, the Court addressed the due pro-
cess limitations on a state's power to civilly commit a person in
3*5O'Connor v. Donaldson. In Donaldson, the Court held that there is no
constitutional basis to civilly commit a person if she is not dangerous
of social tolerance; (2) the individual does not appreciate the deterrent force of the
law; and (3) as measured by magnitude and probability of harm, the individual is
therefore potentially dangerous. Cf id. at 24-25 (discussing the parameters of what
type of behavior may be considered to threaten the general welfare).
32 To commit the noncriminal mentally ill under the parens patriae power, most
states require a showing by clear and convincing proof that: (1) the individual, due to
severe mental illness, is incompetent to make decisions regarding her condition and is
therefore unable to seek appropriate treatment; and (2) the deprivation of liberty is
warranted because the potential of harm to the patient is so great. Cf id. at 24 (strik-
ing a balance between the liberty interest of the ward, her expressed wishes, and the
care that a state may provide). Additionally, Black's Law Dictionary defines parens patriae
as the
role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such
as juveniles or the insane .... It is the principle that the state must care for
those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper
care and custody from their parents. It is a concept of standing utilized to
protect those quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of
the people, interstate water rights, general economy of the state, etc.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). The parens patriae power allows a state
to act as "the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics." 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47.
33 Wilkinson, supra note 19, at 1336 (quoting NICHOLAS N. KrlTRIE, THE RIGHT TO
BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY 76 (1971)).
34A patient may satisfy the Kendra's Law criteria by making a threat or attempt at
violence, even if no such violence occurs, or if the patient has merely been hospitalized
for noncompliance with treatment. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.60(c) (4) (McKin-
ney Supp. 2001).
35 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The respondent, Donaldson, developed paranoid delu-
sions that he was being poisoned and, at his father's instigation, was civilly committed
to a Florida mental hospital for fifteen years. Id. at 564-65. During his commitment,
Donaldson denied that he was ill and refused all treatment. Id. at 565. He claimed
that he was deprived of his constitutional right to liberty when his requests for release
were denied. Id. These requests had been supported by alternative options for treat-
ment. Id. at 567-68.
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to others and is capable of surviving safely in freedom.)6 Although this
case arose in the context of involuntary inpatient mental health
treatment, the issue of outpatient treatment was implicated in Chief
Justice Burger's concurring opinion, in which he stated that the parens
palfiae power can be exercised over a ward in ways other than substan-
tially restraining him.37 He went on to state:
[Hlowever the [parens patriae] power is implemented, due process re-
quires that it not be invoked indiscriminately. At a minimum, a particu-
lar scheme for protection for the mentally ill must rest upon a legislative
determination that it is compatible with the best interests of the affected
class and that its members are unable to act for themselves.
8
This language from Donaldson suggests that a state may justify its use of
the parens patriae power in ordering involuntary outpatient treatment
only if it first determines that such treatment is in the patient's best
interest and that the patient lacks the capacity to decide whether to
seek such treatment. Under this standard, it is important to recognize
that mental illness does not necessarily imply incompetence.' Ken-
dra's Law does not identify impaired decisionmaking ability as a pre-
requisite to administering involuntary outpatient treatment
4 °
While the Donaldson decision appears to limit the states' power to
order AOT, one prominent commentator in the field, Paul F. Stavis,
believes that the Court did not intend to encumber the states' tradi-
tional authority to care for the incompetent:
But since the Court has never before contradicted the power of the state
to care for those who are incompetent to make decisions, e.g., children,
as well as incompetent mentally retarded and mentally ill persons, but
rather has said it is inherent in the power of the government, it is ques-
tionable that the Supreme Court in the Donaldson decision intended to
eliminate or even unduly encumber this traditional power of the state, it
has caused undue confusion and impairment of the state's ability to act
3, See id. at 576 ("[A] State cannot constitutionally confine without more a non-
dangerous individual who is capable of surviving in freedom by himself or with the
help of willing and responsible family members and friends.").
Id. at 583 (Burger, CJ., concurring). Other ways in which the parens patriae
power may be exercised include appointing a guardian to control the ward's property
or placing the ward in the custody of a private third party. Id.
34 Id.
'" See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: MAJOR ISSUES 40 (1981)
("-[Miany persons who are mentally ill are entirely competent to make rational and
important decisions concerning their affairs, including the decision to accept or reject
hospital treatment.'" (quoting Bruce J. Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental illness, 7 CRiM.
L. BULL. 101, 104 (1971))).
4" N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.60(c) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
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appropriately and sAiftly.41
Consistent with Stavis's theory, and despite the Court's apparent
attempt to provide minimal protections to the mentally ill and limit
the states' power to civilly commit them, the trend has been towards
expansion of the parens patriae power. In 1983, the American Psychi-
atric Association ("APA") promulgated its Model Law for Civil Com-
mitment.42 The APA's Model Law provides for commitment of those
who are "likely to suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration,""
which has the effect of "[s]ignificantly... expand[ing] current parens
patriae commitment [power to reach] ... many of those severely
mentally ill people who. .. roam the streets aimlessly and without
hope."4 4 Under this standard, the court is not required to find danger
or harm. Such an expansion of power accords with the conventional
understanding of the justifications for parens patriae. Consistent with
the APA's suggestion, many states have incorporated either a "passive
harm" (deterioration) standard or a "gravely disabled" or "unable to
provide for basic needs" standard into their civil commitment laws.'
Kendra's Law has incorporated the deterioration standard into law. It
does so by providing for outpatient treatment if it is needed to "pre-
vent a relapse or deterioration which would be likely to result in serious
harm to the patient or others."6
Thus, it appears that the states have strayed from the police power
justification for civil commitment-as that justification implies that
there is a need to protect the public from danger. There is no such
need, however, if the "dangerousness" standard is not incorporated
into the law. The mere fact that one has deteriorated or is unable to
provide for basic needs is not a sufficient rationale by which the State
may claim that the public health, safety, and general welfare are
threatened. Therefore, the parens patriae power is a more plausible
foundation for the states' commitment power, given that they will ex-
ercise this power if the patient is a danger to himself (even in a passive
sense, by not seeking necessary treatment) and lacks the capacity to
41 Paul F. Stavis, Civil Commitment Past, Present, and Future, Address at the Na-
tional Conference of the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (July 21, 1995), at
http://www.psychlaws.org/LegalResources/articles/LawArticle2.htm.
42 Klapper, supra note 22, at 754.
43 Id. at 754 n.32.
44 Id. at 754-55.
45 See infra notes 54, 56-57 and accompanying text (providing examples of such
statutes).
46 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c) (6) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
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make a reasoned decision about whether or not to seek treatment, as
was the situation in Donaldson.7
C. States'Approaches to Outpatient Commitment
1. Sources of Authority and Standards for AOT
With the passage of Kendra's Law in 1999, New York joined forty
other states and the District of Columbia in providing outpatient
commitment to people suffering from mental illnesses. 3 Prior to
1994, New York was the only state that had a statute specifically pro-
hibiting outpatient commitment. 49 In 1994, legislation was passed
permitting the Bellevue Pilot Program." Subsequently, Kendra's Law
took effect on November 8, 1999.
Of the forty states that provide for AOT, only ten (including New
York) specify different criteria for inpatient and outpatient commit-
ment.' In these states, the standards for inpatient commitment are
more stringent, presumably due to the increased restraint on liberty
involved with inpatient treatment." In addition, the creation of a dif-
4 Supra text accompanying note 38.
1 Jennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a Lethal Dose to
Kendra's Law, 68 FoRDHAm L. REV. 2401, 2408 (2000). Currently, only California,
Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, and New
Mexico do not have AOT laws. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Fact Sheet: Out-
patient Civil Commitment (July 14, 1999), at http://ww.ncsl.org/programs/health/
hpts/commiLhtm.
' Torrey & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 781-82.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. Lmv § 9.61 (b) (McKinney 1996) (renumbered § 9.63 by 1999
N.Y. Laws 408, § 9). A study of the pilot program at Bellevue Hospital revealed that
those who participated spent fifty-seven percent less time in the hospital than those
who did not participate. Press Release, D.J. Jaffe, N.Y. Coordinator, N.Y. Treatment
Advocacy Coalition, New York Stands at Crossroads of Success or Failure: NYS Must
Expand Outpatient Commitment Statewide for Individuals with Severe
Psychiatric Illnesses (Jan. 28, 1999), at http://ww.psychlaws.org/PressRoom/
stmt-dj%20N Y%20AG.htm.
1 ALx. CODE § 22-52-10.3 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.795 (Michie 2000); GA.
CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(12.1) (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-121 (1993); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 12-26-14-1 (West 1994); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c) (McKinney Supp. 2001);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-267(h) (1999); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034
(Vernon Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie Supp. 2000); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.05.240 (West Supp. 2001).
, For example, in the Alabama statutes, ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.3 to -10.4 (1997),
the criteria for inpatient and outpatient commitment are virtually the same, except
that for inpatient treatment there is the additional requirement that "as a result of the
mental illness the respondent poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to
self and/or others," id. § 22-52-10.4(a) (ii).
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ferent standard for outpatient commitment allows the state to reach
persons uncommittable under the inpatient statute. 3
Several states have adopted the APA's "passive harm" or deteriora-
tion standard into their civil commitment laws, 4 thereby exercising
their police and parens patriae powers to the outermost limits.5 New
York is among the fourteen states whose laws fall within this category."'
Most states, but not New York, have also incorporated a "gravely dis-
abled" or "unable to provide for basic needs" standard, which also ex-
tends the parens patriae authority to "passive harms.,
5 7
2. States' Utilization of and Success with
Outpatient Commitment
State laws that allow for intervention before the patient poses a
risk of current danger are known as "preventive commitment."'" The
targets of preventive commitment statutes are "revolving door" pa-
tients-patients who, as a consequence of medication noncompliance,
1 For example, Washington's statute for inpatient and outpatient commitment
differs only by whether a more or less restrictive alternative is in the best interest of the
patient. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.240 (West Supp. 2001). If a more restrictive
treatment is in the best interest of the patient, then inpatient treatment is authorized;
if a less restrictive course of treatment is in the best interest of the patient, then outpa-
tient treatment is authorized. Id.
5 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.2(ii) (1997) (describing as civilly commitable one
who has, as a result of the mental illness, "experience[d] deterioration of the ability to
function independently"); OR. REv. STAT. § 426.005(1) (d) (C) (iv) (Supp. 1998) (defin-
ing a "[m]entally ill person" as one who "[u]nless treated, will continue.., to physi-
caly or mentally deteriorate so that that the person will be [dangerous to self or oth-
ers, or unable to provide for basic personal needs]"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 7101(16) (B) (1987) (defining "[a] patient in need of further treatment" as one who
"is receiving adequate treatment, and who, if such treatment is discontinued, presents
a substantial probability that in the near future his condition will deteriorate").
5 See supra Part I.B (explaining the legal foundation for deinstitutionalization and
outpatient commitment).
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.60(c) (6) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (noting that a pa-
tient may need AOT "in order to prevent a relapse or deterioration which would be
likely to result in serious harm to the patient or others").
57 See, e.g,, HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-1 (1993) (employing a "gravely disabled" stan-
dard); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (b) (West 1999) (defining a "person requir-
ing treatment" as "[a]n individual who... as a result of... mental illness is unable to
attend to those of his or her basic physical needs such as food, clothing, or shelter");
VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie Supp. 2000) (providing that a person can be com-
mitted if he is "so severely mentally ill as to be substantially unable to care for him-
self').
53 See McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 29 (describing states' use of involuntary
outpatient commitment).
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are repeatedly released and rehospitalized.59 North Carolina has been
widely recognized as the leader in implementing preventive commit-
ment.' Studies of outpatient commitment in North Carolina were
undertaken by Hiday and Scheid-Cook, who found that both hospital
admissions and length of hospital stays were reduced for patients par-
ticipating in outpatient commitment.6' Such success was found to
turn on staff dedication, rather than on coercion.62 In fact, North
Carolina's statute minimizes compulsion and prohibits forced medica-
tion, except in the event of an emergency.' Hawaii's statute similarly
prevents such coercion." In both North Carolina and Hawaii, if the
patient refuses to comply, the only remaining alternative is rehospi-
talizationY' Critics condemn this lack of meaningful enforcement
mechanisms and believe that "[p]reventive commitment... works
merely as a form ofjudicial intimidation. Compliance is achieved only
if the person fears rehospitalization or mistakenly believes that the
court's order must be obeyed."66 In contrast, Georgia's outpatient
commitment statute authorizes forced medication as the solution to
enforcement difficulties.
67
Despite this claimed success in North Carolina, the Hiday and
Scheid-Cook study also found that about half of those ordered to out-
patient commitment were not appropriate candidates for such com-
mitment because they had no prior history of hospitalizations, no in-
dications of prior dangerousness, and no prior history of medication
refusal. ' " This finding provides grounds for a constitutional challenge
Torrey & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 779.
Ronald L. WisorJr., Community Care, Competition and Coercion: A Legal Perspective
on Privatized Mental Health Care, 19 AM.J.L. & MED. 145, 166 (1993).
,I See Virginia Aldig6 Hiday & Teresa L. Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina Experience
with Outpatient Commitment: A Critical Appraisal, 10 INT'LJ.L. & PSyCHIATRY 215, 232
(1987) (noting this result as a response to state statutory revisions tightening the crite-
ria for involuntary hospitalization and giving due process to respondents of civil com-
mitment petitions).
'" See id. at 230 (finding that in the most successful community programs, the staff
did whatever was necessary to keep patients in the community, including supplying
transportation,jobs, schooling, recreation, child care, money for medication, adequate
housing, and training opportunities).
,_ N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-273(a) (3) (1999). The physician may try to persuade a
noncompliant patient and make any "reasonable effort" to gain compliance, but may
not forcibly administer medication. Id. § 122C-273(a) (2).
HA-tW. REv. STAT. § 334-129(b) (1993).
Id. § 334-129(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-273(a) (2) (1999).
Wisor, supra note 60, at 171.
GA. CODEANN. § 37-3-82(b) (1995).
Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 61, at 222.
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that the statute is overinclusive and not rationally related to the State's
objectives.69 To avoid this problem, an outpatient commitment statute
should be drafted to require demonstrated histories of rehospitaliza-
tion, a persistent pattern of noncompliance in the community, and
deterioration to dangerousness.70 The current criteria for Kendra's
Law does include such requirements, making it more constitutionally
sound than North Carolina's statute.71
Other studies of outpatient commitment have been performed in
the District of Columbia, Arizona, and Tennessee.72 In the District of
Columbia, a study revealed that outpatient commitment reduced hos-
pital readmissions by half and shortened inpatient stays.73 In Arizona,
a study found that outpatient commitment kept patients in treatment
longer, shortened inpatient stays, and possibly reduced violent epi-
sodes.74 However, Bursten's study of outpatient treatment in Tennes-
see revealed that it had no effect on readmission rates over a fourteen-
month period. 5
In a survey undertaken by Torrey and Kaplan in 1994, only thir-
teen states and the District of Columbia commonly utilized outpatient
commitment.76 The thirteen states characterized the use of outpatient
commitment as rare, citing reasons that Torrey and Kaplan organize
into eight groups. First, mental health professionals voiced concerns
about civil liberties and expressed a dedication to increasing individ-
ual autonomy.78 Second, mental health professionals were concerned
69 See Wisor, supra note 60, at 169.
70 Id.
71 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.60 (c) (4) (i) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (requiring a
history of lack of compliance with treatment that has resulted in hospitalization at least
twice within the last three years); see also infra note 175 (referring to the requirements
of the New York statute).
72 Torrey & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 779.
73 Id. (citing Guido Zanni & Leslie deVeau, Inpatient Stays Before and After Outpatient
Commitment, 37 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 941 (1986); D. Band et al., Outpatient
Commitment: A 13-year Experience, ST. ELIZABETHS HOSP. CONTINUING MED. EDUC.
NEWSL. (St. Elizabeths Hosp., D.C.), Dec. 1984, at 1).
74 Id. (citing Robert A. Van Putten et al., Involuntary Outpatient Commitment in Ari-
zona: A Retrospective Study, 39 HOSP. & COMMUNrrYPSYCHIATRY953 (1988)).
75 Ben Bursten, Posthospital Mandatory Outpatient Treatment, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1255, 1257 (1986) ("[T]he data do not support the effectiveness of the law [of involun-
tary outpatient commitment]."). Torrey and Kaplan speculate, however, that this lack
of success may be due to failure to vigorously enforce the law. Torrey & Kaplan, supra
note 12, at 779.
76 Torrey & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 782.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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about liability if outpatients under their supervision committed
crimes. 7" Third, some mental health centers had a relative lack of in-
terest in treating mentally ill individuals.* Fourth, some states noted
that outpatient commitment imposes a fiscal burden on mental health
centers because of the need to hire additional staff to monitor com-
pliance."' In a few states, inpatients were the fiscal responsibility of the
state, but outpatient commitments were the fiscal responsibility of the
counties, which created a further disincentive to use outpatient com-
mitment. 2 Fifth, some states were concerned that noncompliance
with outpatient commitment would lead to increased demand for
hospital beds." Sixth, states with more stringent commitment criteria
were less likely to use outpatient commitment.34 In contrast, states
with less restrictive criteria, such as the "gravely disabled" or "unable
to provide for basic needs" standard were more likely to use outpa-
tient commitment.85 Seventh, the lack of consequences for patients
who fail to comply with a treatment plan have deterred some states
from using outpatient commitment 6 States that permit involuntary
medication, however, have made more use of outpatient commit-
ment.7 States that do not permit involuntary medication have found
that the process of rehospitalizing an outpatient is both cumbersome
and time-consuming." Finally, the authors found "a lack of awareness
and knowledge about outpatient commitment" among state officials,
mental health centers, consumers, and families.89
Such collateral concerns result in the wide underutilization of
outpatient commitment. Legislation authorizing outpatient commit-
ment is not sufficient to promote its use without addressing the above
concerns. Some states have turned from outpatient commitment to
other alternatives, such as conditional release. In New Hampshire, for
T, Id.
Id.
' Id.
' Id.
Id. As Torrey and Kaplan note, however, prior studies of outpatient commit-
ment suggest a decrease in hospitalization. Id.
4 Id.
,. Id.; see also supra notes 54, 57 (providing examples of state statutes that utilize
such criteria).
Torrey & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 782.
,7 &, id. (noting how outpatient commitment programs that allow for built-in con-
sequences are used regularly in some states that allow involuntary medication).
Id. at 783.
Id.
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example, conditional release is preferred to outpatient commitment. ""
In California, conservatorship-guardianship is often used, though it is
not frequently used in other states where it is available, such as Massa-
chusetts and New Mexico.9' Other states have developed informal
mechanisms for achieving voluntary compliance with medication,
such as "suspend[ing] an inpatient commitment hearing on the con-
dition that the individual undergo voluntary outpatient treatment.'1
2
Rhode Island, Virginia, and Vermont have found that "Judicial
wrath,' [or] a stern lecture by ajudge on the necessity of treatment, is
sometimes effective" in securing compliance. Also, "the threat of in-
patient commitment [is] occasionally used to compel outpatient com-
pliance."94
Despite these alternatives, outpatient commitment statutes con-
tinue to exist in forty-one states.9 Outpatient commitment has not
been utilized uniformly across the country, and it has met with varying
degrees of success. North Carolina is considered to be the most suc-
cessful in implementing outpatient commitment programs, yet the
State's statute may be unconstitutionally overbroad." A statute
authorizing outpatient commitment needs to be narrowly tailored to
target the appropriate population and be rationally related to the
State's goals of protecting society from harmful individuals and pro-
tecting affected individuals from themselves. Kendra's Law is New
York's attempt to accomplish these objectives.
D. Mechanics of Kendra's Law
Under Kendra's Law a court may order a person to submit to AOT
only if certain criteria are met.97 The statute provides specific proce-
dures for the issuance of AOT orders, beginning with the filing of a
4O Id. For an explanation of conditional release, see McCafferty & Dooley, supra
note 29, at 279-81.
q1 Torrey & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 780. Although conservatorship-guardianship
is used in California, it is often used as a way of coercing compliance with outpatient
commitment programs. Id. For an explanation of conservatorship-guardianship, see
id. at 779.
92 Id. at 780 (noting that this practice is prevalent in Kentucky, Oregon, and Wyo-
ming).
93 Id. at 781.
94 Id.
95 Supra note 48 and accompanying text.
"1 See supra Part I.C.2 (describing the different state programs and their success).
97 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (detailing the re-
quirements for court-ordered AOT).
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petition in the supreme or county court." "The petition is a formal
statement of facts demonstrating that the person meets the criteria for
AOT." ' Only individuals with particular relationships to the potential
outpatient may file a petition on behalf of someone thought to be in
need of AOT. ..... The locality's mental health director is not required
"to file petitions at the request of other parties," but she is required to
"investigate reports of indiiduals alleged to be in need of AOT."'O' In
addition, the petition must be supported by the affidavit of a physician
who has examined the patient within the last ten days, stating that the
individual meets the criteria for AOT. 1 2 Alternatively, the physician
may state that she was unable to obtain the patient's consent to con-
duct an examination in the past ten days but has reason to believe that
AOT is warranted.1 ''3 "In both cases, the physician must be willing to
testify at the court hearing."1 ' The petition must be sened not only
on the subject, but also on "the subject's nearest known relative; Men-
tal Hygiene Legal Senices (MHLS); any health care agent appointed
by the person in a health care proxy... ; the [AOT] program coordi-
nator appointed by [the Office of Mental Health] ... ; and the ap-
propriate [AOT] mental health director."' ° The court is required to
set a hearing date no more than three days after the petition for AOT
is filed, although adjournments can be granted for good cause.'" No-
tice of the hearing is given to all parties who received notice of the pe-
tition.' 7
Various procedural protections are granted to the subject of the
SKeindra 's Law: The Process, supra note 23, at 4.
Id.
"' The following individuals may file a petition:
an adult roommate... ; a parent, spouse, adult child or adult sibling... ; the
director of a hospital where the recipient is hospitalized; the director of a pub-
lic or charitable organization, agency, or home that provides mental health
services to the recipient and in whose institution the recipient resides; a
[qualified] psychiatrist who is either treating the recipient or supervising the
recipient's treatment for mental illness; the director of community serv-
ices... or social services official of the city or county where the recipient is
present or believed to be present; or a parole officer or probation officer as-
signed to supervise the recipient.
Id.
'' Id.
I d. at 4-5.
'',, Id. at 5.
'- Id.
5 Id.
Id.
Id.
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petition. "The subject.., is entitled to legal representation from
MHLS or a private attorney at all stages of the proceeding" and is "af-
forded an opportunity to present evidence, to call witnesses and to
cross-examine adverse witnesses.""0 8 The court may consider any ad-
missible evidence, including testimony from the petitioner or from
the subject (if she chooses to testify).'°9 The court must consider the
testimony of the examining physician who filed the affidavit with the
petition.110 The physician must state "the facts and rationale support-
ing the need for AOT.""' Most importantly, the physician must sup-
port the conclusion "that AOT is the least restrictive alternative of treat-
ment." 1 2 At this time, the court may order the patient to submit to an
examination by a court-appointed physician if she had refused to be
examined at the time the petition was filed.1 ' If the court believes the
allegations in the petition to be true and the subject continues to re-
sist examination, the court may order law enforcement officials to take
the subject to a hospital for an examination for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the criteria for AOT are met.14 The patient may not
be retained at the hospital, however, for more than twenty-four
hours."5
A proposed written plan for treatment developed by the examin-
ing physician must be submitted to the court before AOT will be or-
dered." 6 The patient, the patient's treating physician, relative, close
friend, or other concerned individual may actively participate in the
development of the treatment plan.' 7 The plan must utilize case
management services or assertive community treatment ("ACT")
teams to coordinate care and may also include therapy, medication,
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
III Id.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
"3 Id.
114 Id.; see also In re Dir. of Cmty. Servs., 715 N.Y.S.2d 833 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000)
(holding that the statute does not implicitly require a hearing to determine whether
there is reasonable cause to believe that the allegations in the petition are true before
the patient is taken into custody for a physical examination).
Kendra's Law: The Process, supra note 23, at 5.
116 Id. The plan must be submitted to the court within three business days of the
hearing, but if the petitioner is a mental health director or a director of an AOT pro-
gram, then the plan is to be provided to the court by the date of the hearing. Id.
117 See Office of Counsel, N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, Summai--An
Explanation of Kendra's Law, at http://www.omh.state.ny.us/omhweb/Kendra web/
Ksummary.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2000).
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substance-abuse counseling and treatment, educational and/or voca-
tional activities, and supervision of living arrangements."' If medica-
tion is proposed as part of the plan, the doctor must testify as to the
types of medication recommended and "dosage ranges, the beneficial
as well as detrimental physical and mental effects of the medica-
tion(s), and... whether the medications should be self-administered
or administered by authorized personnel.""' In addition, if medica-
tion is recommended, the plan may include compliance monitoring,
such as periodic blood tests or urinalysis. 2" Alcohol or illegal sub-
stances testing may also be included if the plan provides for alcohol or
substance abuse counseling. 2 ' Testing may only be included, how-
ever, if the patient "has a history of alcohol or substance abuse which
is clinically related to his or her mental illness, and the testing is nec-
essary to prevent a relapse or deterioration which would be likely to
result in serious harm to the self or others." Any order for such tests
must be reviewed after six months by a physician, who may then ter-
minate the testing. '
Finally, the court will issue an order for AOT if, "after hearing all
relevant evidence .... the court finds by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the subject.., meets the criteria for AOT and that [AOT]
is the least restrictive appropriate treatment." 2' In determining the
final AOT order, the court will also consider any directives that may
have been executed by the subject in a health care proxy.2 5 "If... the
court concludes that all the criteria for AOT are not met, the petition
must be dismissed.""'2 If an order for AOT is rendered, it is effective
for six months and may be extended in one-year periods, so long as
the subject continues to meet all of the AOT criteria. 27 "[T]he order
is directed to both the person receiving AOT and also to the local di-
rector of the AOT program." 28 The individual must accept the treat-
Kiidra's Law: The Process, supra note 23, at 5-6.
, Id. at 6.
Id.
J21-1 Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
- Id. at 6. For a discussion of the least restrictive alternative doctrine, see also su-
pra note 23.
'* Kendra's Law: The Process, supra note 23, at 7.
L. Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
'2> Id. at 6.
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ment and the local AOT director must furnish the treatment,)
Once an AOT order has been issued by the court, the New York
State Office of Mental Health ("OMH") is required to monitor and
report all noncompliance.'3 A case manager or ACT team will coor-
dinate the provision of all court-ordered services and closely monitor
the patient's progress.131 The case manager or ACT team will also re-
port all noncompliance to the county or City of New York mental
health director. 2 However, medication "may not be administered
over the individual's objection."33 In cases of noncompliance, a phy-
sician may recommend that the patient be taken to a hospital and be
retained there for up to seventy-two hours to determine if a need ex-
ists for inpatient treatment.3 4 Noncompliance may be a factor in de-. 1 • • 135
termining involuntary admission. Mandatory quarterly reports must
be submitted to the OMH Program Coordinator for additional over-
sight.
136
II. EVALUATION OF NEWYORK'S STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR AOT
A. Federal Constitutional Analysis
1. Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]o State ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." 7 The courts have used the Due
Process Clause to protect substantive as well as procedural rights.3 In
129 Id.
130 Id. at 7.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.; see also infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
134 Kendra's Law: The Process, supra note 23, at 7.
135 A recipient's failure to comply with an order for AOT is not grounds for in-
voluntary civil commitment or contempt of court. However, any refusal of the
individual to take prescribed medication, or the failure of a test to determine
either medication compliance or alcohol or drug use, may be considered by
the physician in reaching a clinical determination regarding involuntary ad-
mission.
Id.
136 Id.
137 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (provid-
ing for strict scrutiny of noneconomic political and social rights); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (providing substantive due process protection for the
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considering substantive due process, the courts have developed a
three-prong analysis, evaluating: (1) the compelling nature of the
government's objective; (2) the liberty interests sacrificed in further-
ing the government's objective; and (3) whether the means and ends
are rationally related.'3 ' The closeness of fit between means and ends
implicates the least restrictive alternative doctrine in the context of
mental health law."
The least restrictive alternative doctrine requires that treatment
be provided in the least restrictive feasible manner, in order to serve
the dual objectives of preserving the individual's autonomy to the
greatest extent possible while simultaneously ensuring public safety. If
less restrictive yet appropriate alternatives to institutionalization exist,
then the states would be obligated to consider them. Moreover, the
doctrine mandates that the State provide community-based treatment
as an option. With the passage of Kendra's Law, New York has pro-
vided a less restrictive option than institutionalization for the mentally
ill. Kendra's Law specifically requires the examining physician to tes-
tify that assisted outpatient commitment is the least restrictive alterna-
tive course of treatment.
1 41
Although New York requires that less restrictive alternatives be ex-
amined before a patient is committed to outpatient care, the State
might not even be constitutionally required to provide such options.
That issue has arisen in the context of an inpatient seeking less restric-
tive outpatient care. While the courts seemed receptive to the doc-
nine and the idea of mandatory community-based alternatives in Lake
v. Cameron142 in 1966, by 1982, the Supreme Court retreated from the
concept in Youngberg v. Romeo.4 3 In Lake, a nondangerous mentally
retarded woman asserted the right to have the court consider less re-
strictive alternatives before committing her to St. Elizabeths Hospi-
tal. " ' The court ordered that the trial court make "an earnest ef-
fort... to review and exhaust available resources of the
community.""' The patient, however, was merely accorded an empty
economic right of freedom of contract).
I Ser, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (holding that a regulation limit-
ing "fundamental rights" must be narrowly tailored to a "compelling state interest");
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (noting that such regulation may
not sweep too broadly).
l4, See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
1 N.Y. MNIENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.60(h) (4) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
14. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
1- 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
1 Lake, 364 F.2d at 659.
1 ill Id. at 660.
1201
1202 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:1181
right because no less restrictive alternatives were available. The court
did not decide whether the states would be obligated to provide
community-based treatment should it not be available.4 6
In Youngberg, the patient was a mentally retarded man who was in-
voluntarily confined at the Pennhurst mental institution. The patient
claimed that his confinement violated his due process rights to safe
conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraints, and the
right to minimal training and development of basic skills. 7 The
Court accepted all three claims, characterizing them collectively as the
constitutional right to "minimally adequate care and treatment" only
where it was necessary to sustain liberty interests in safety and move-
ment. 48 The Court thus rejected the least restrictive alternative doc-
trine and gave deference to the judgment of mental health profes-
sionals in deciding what type of treatment and in what setting it is
most appropriate. 49
The Youngberg decision left uncertain whether a constitutional
right to community-based treatment exists. Since Youngberg, courts
have made its implications explicit-both in abandoning the least re-
strictive alternative doctrine and in insisting on deferring to profes-
sional judgment. For example, the Second Circuit, in Society for Good
Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, held that "there is no constitu-
tional right to a least restrictive environment."' Furthermore, the
Supreme Court, in the 1984 decision of Pennhurst State School & Hospi-
tal v. Halderman, ruled that federal judges cannot impose the obliga-
146 Id. at 662.
:47 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-17.
48 Id. at 319. The Court stated that "[a]s a general matter, a State is under no con-
stitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border." Id. at 317.
The Court did recognize, however, a state's duty to care for those whose liberty it had
restricted. See id. at 322 (imposing liability for "substantial departure[s] from accepted
professional judgment, practice or standards" on the part of state institutional adminis-
trators).
149 Id. at 319; see also Bruce A. Arrigo, The Logic of Identity and the Politics ofJustice:
Establishing a Right to Community-Based Treatment for the Institutionalized Aentally Disabled,
18 NEw ENG.J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 3 (1997) ("Not only did Youngberg
dispense with 'the least intrusive means' doctrine.... but it substituted this standard
by giving deference to accepted professional judgment that carried with it the pre-
sumption of validity.").
1A 737 F.2d 1239, 1249 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243,
1249 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting the district court's denial of the existence of such a con-
stitutional right being at issue); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 93 (3d Cir. 1986) (outlin-
ing the quid pro quo theory of commitment); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 268-69
(3d Cir. 1983) (summarizing the Court's decision in Youngberg).
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tion to consider less restrictive alternatives on state officials."' The
Court interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as barring federal courts
from ordering state officials to comply with state laws."
2
In light of these Supreme Court and federal court decisions, most
states have incorporated the least restrictive alternative doctrine into
their commitment laws, although they are not constitutionally re-
quired to do so. Yet, this right to treatment in the least restrictive set-
ting is theoretical, as many states' civil commitment laws require only
that alternatives that are "available" be considered, whether or not
what is available is appropriate.53
Although New York's outpatient law does not specify that only
"available" alternatives be consideredf'5 it is unlikely that the courts
will interpret Kendra's Law to constitutionally require the develop-
ment of community-based alternatives, or even less restrictive alterna-
tives, given the Society for Good Will opinion.1 '5 In the aftermath of the
Youngberg decision, it is logical to assume that there is likewise no con-
stitutional right to less restrictive alternatives than community-based
care. Although Kendra's Law provides an empty right to the least re-
strictive alternative course of treatment, it is not constitutionally defi-
cient in this regard. In practice, Kendra's Law stipulates that the
OMH must provide grants to counties to enable them to better track
mentally ill people when they are discharged from psychiatric hospi-
tals, state prisons, or county jails. Under the Medication Grant Pro-
gram, the OMH must also help to furnish such patients with the psy-
chiatric medications they need while they are applying for Medicaid."
The 2001-2002 New York State Executive Budget provides these
465 U.S. 89 (1984).
1 Id.
See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.011(7) (Michie 1998); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 5122.15(E) (Anderson 1998); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 571.004(1), 576.021(1) (Vernon 1992); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-3(a) (1999).
)_4 Se N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(h) (4) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (noting that
the treatment must be "the least restrictive alternative").
See Sj :y for Good 1ill, 737 F.2d at 1249 ("[T] here is no constitutional right to
community placement. ...").
Kendra's Law: Mew York's Assisted Outpatient Treatment Law, OMH Q., Dec. 1999,
at 3,3.
Within amounts appropriated therefor, the commissioner of mental health
shall provide grants to each rounty and the city of New York, which shall be
used by each such county ir city, to provide medication, and other services
necessary to prescribe anA administer medication to treat mental illness dur-
ing the pendency of a rwedical assistance eligibility determination.
1999 N.Y. Laws 408, § 15(a' ; see also infra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing
the proisions of the Med-cation Grant Program).
1203
1204 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:1181
grants, which hopefully will be sufficient to carry out the objectives of
Kendra's Law.
57
Substantive due process concerns are also implicated by the pa-
tient's deprivation of a degree of liberty when she is forced to un-
dergo any type of treatment, even if that treatment is in an outpatient
setting. When curtailing an individual's liberty, the court must not
only consider the fit between means and ends, but also how compel-
ling the government's objective is and the liberty interests that are
sacrificed in furthering that objective.'
The government's stated objective, as gleaned from its legislative
findings, is to aid people who would be "capable of living in the com-
munity with the help of family, friends, and mental health profession-
als, but who, without routine care and treatment, may relapse and be-
come violent or suicidal, or require hospitalization."' 59 This is a parens-
patriae-based, paternalistic goal of treating people for their own good.
Implicit in this objective is also a police-power-based goal of protect-
ing society from the violent acts sometimes committed by the mentally
ill against innocent bystanders, such as Kendra Webdale.' 60
Despite the compelling nature of these objectives, substantive due
process requires that they be balanced against the liberty interests of
the mentally ill that are sacrificed when being forced to comply with a
court order for AOT.16' Kendra's Law requires the patient to accept
the treatment but does not allow for medication to be administered
17 New York State claims that the 2001-2002 Executive Budget "fully funds Ken-
dra's Law programs." 2001-02 Executive Budget Overview, at http://www.ny.us/dob/
pubs/executive/01021ittlebook/mh.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2001). Approved fund-
ing includes $32 million in General Fund support for AOT and the Medication Grant
Program. Id. Additionally, the Budget provides $125 million in funding for the En-
hanced Community Services program, which "provide[s] case managers for nearly
12,600 additional children and adults... ; 2,000 new supported apartments; and
added services for children with serious emotional disturbances." Id. Furthermore,
the Budget provides a $5.2-million increase in funds for the State's supported housing
program. Id. Stipends provided by OMH will allow New York City to spend as much as
$10,912 per bed. Id. By the end of the fiscal year, an additional 2700 community beds
will be available to New Yorkers with mental illnesses, bringing the total of such beds to
26,400 and representing an increase of almost 40% since 1995. Id.
158 See supra note 139 and accompanying text (outlining the three-pronged sub-
stantive due process analysis).
159 1999 N.Y. Laws 408, § 2.
160 See Spitzer, supra note 4 ("Kendra's Law is intelligent public policy that will help
protect the public and mentally ill from tragic incidents.").
161 See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1458 (11th Cir. 1984) ("In order to de-
termine whether a substantive [due process] right.., has been violated, it is necessary
to balance the liberty of the individual against the demands of an organized society.").
2001] A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF KENDRA "S LAW
over the patient's objection. 62 In practice, however, the patient may
have little choice in deciding whether or not to comply with the
treatment plan, as noncompliance is one factor that a physician may
consider when determining the need for involuntary inpatient treat-
ment."" Whether or not the physician actually takes noncompliance
into account is irrelevant as long as the patient perceives that non-
compliance will lead to hospitalization and therefore feels compelled
to comply. The right to reject the treatment may be more of an empty
right than an actual one.
The patient's liberty is not only restricted by the treatment plan it-
self, but also by the preliminary procedures. These procedures pro-
vide for a court-ordered physical examination during the hearing if
the patient had formerly refused to submit to one (allowing the pa-
tient to be held for up to twenty-four hours) and a physician-
recommended physical examination in cases of noncompliance (al-
lowing the patient to be held for up to seventy-two hours)." ' In addi-
tion, the patient's liberty may be restricted if the treatment plan re-
quires alcohol and substance-abuse testing.
In O'Conner v. Donaldson, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
"a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a non-
dangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or
friends."' 5 Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion implicated the
issue of outpatient commitment by suggesting that a state is justified
in asserting its parens patriae power to order outpatient commitment of
a nondangerous individual only if it first determines that to do so
would be in the patient's best interest and that the patient lacks deci-
sionmaking capacity."5"
Kendra's Law only partially satisfies the Donaldson requirements
needed to justify the sacrifice of liberty entailed in AOT. Kendra's
Law does require, in its stated criteria, that AOT be in the patient's
J.'- See Kendra's Law: The Process, supra note 23, at 7 ("Even when medications are
included in the AOT order, they may not be administered over the individual's objec-
tion.").
)" See id. ("[A]ny refusal of the indidual to take prescribed medication ... may
be considered by the physician in reaching a clinical determination regarding involun-
tar) admission.").
b Id. at 5, 7.
422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
See id. at 583 (Burger, GJ., concurring); supra Po'n, l.B (explaining the legal
foundation of deinstitutionalization in terms of a state's police, or parens patriae,
power).
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best interest. 67 Kendra's Law, however, does not mandate that deci-
sionmaking capacity be impaired before involuntary outpatient treat-
ment is ordered.' Thus, Kendra's Law does not meet Donaldson's
substantive due process requirements. Simply adding a clinical de-
termination that the patient lacks decisionmaking capacity to the cri-
teria could cure this. 69
In balancing the "liberty of the individual" against "the demands
of an organized society," the nondangerous character of the individ-
ual must also be considered. 70 As discussed in Part I.B, Kendra's Law
follows a "deterioration" standard, which allows for outpatient com-
mitment for passive harms or before the patient becomes dangerous
to herself or others. Prior to Kendra's Law, the law in New York re-
quired that an individual pose an imminent danger to herself or oth-
ers before civil commitment could be ordered, but these standards
were believed by many to be too high.'72 Waiting until a mentally ill
individual deteriorates to the point of dangerousness may make
treatment more difficult and may come too late to serve the State's
dual goals of protecting the individual and society from violent behav-
ior.
By abandoning the dangerousness requirement, Kendra's Law is
vulnerable to a due process challenge on the grounds that the statute
is overinclusive and reaches people who are not appropriate candi-
dates for AOT.173 This was a major criticism of North Carolina's out-
167 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c) (7) (McKinney Supp. 2001) ("[It is likely
that the patient will benefit from assisted outpatient treatment... ").
168 Id. § 9.60(c) (lacking any such criterion).
169 Adding such a requirement, however, would circumvent the legislative intent of
the statute, as it "contemplates [the] treatment of patients ... who have the capacity to
make treatment decisions," especially those who are about to be discharged from the
hos ital. In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862, 868 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1458 (11th Cir. 1984).
171 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that Kendra's Law provides for
outpatient treatment to prevent relapse or deterioration).
See Gary Spencer, 'Kendra's Law' Gets Backing by Both Parties, N.Y. LJ., May 20,
1999, at I (noting that Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, prior to the passage of Kendra's
Law, expressed that "[tihe thresholds that have to be met to satisfy that [law] are too
high").
173 By abandoning the current dangerousness requirement, preventive com-
mitment statutes also eliminate a critical check on the discretion ofjudges who
issue commitment orders. They are left with the inordinately difficult task of
predicting future dangerousness.... Such inappropriate use of preventive
commitment laws invites constitutional challenges on the grounds that the
statute is overinclusive and not rationally related to the state's objectives.
Wisor, supra note 60, at 169.
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patient commitment statute.'7 The criteria used in Kendra's Law,
however, include safeguards that make it more likely that only the in-
tended population will come within the reach of the statute.' The
New York statute is more narrowly tailored than North Carolina's,
which requires neither a history of noncompliance with treatment nor
episodes or threats of violent behavior towards self or others.'76
On balance, Kendra's Law is narrowly tailored and rationally re-
lated to its goals of caring for the mentally ill and protecting society
from violent behavior caused by mentally ill individuals who are not
aware of the nature and consequences of their actions. In fact, the
statute may be underinclusive in the sense that it is silent on the issue
of those who voluntarily seek mental health care, as did Andrew Gold-
stein, who ironically sought care many times before he ultimately
killed Kendra Webdale.'77 The State's goals are compelling enough to
justify restrictions on the individual's liberty, assuming that only the
appropriate candidates for AOT come within the reach of the statute.
174 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting the results of outpatient com-
mitment studies in North Carolina).
17-, See N.Y. MEN-TAL HYG. LAw § 9.60(c) (4) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (requiring a
history of lack of compliance with treatment that has resulted either in hospitalization
at least twice within the last three years or in one or more incidents of serious violent
behavior or threats of violent behavior towards self or others within the last four years).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d) (1) (1996). The North Carolina statute's criteria
are:
a. The respondent is mentally ill;
b. The respondent is capable of surviving safely in the community with avail-
able supervision from family, friends, or others;
c. Based on the respondent's psychiatric history, the respondent is in need of
treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration that would
predictably result in dangerousness ... ; and
d. The respondent's current mental status or the nature of the respondent's
illness limits or negates the respondent's ability to make an informed decision
to seek voluntarily or comply with recommended treatment.
Id.
13 Critics note the irony is that Andrew Goldstein had voluntarily sought
treatment, again and again, before he killed Webdale.... [Hie requested
long-term hospitalization in NewYork more than once, and yet after each hos-
pitalization-there were more than a dozen in two years-he was discharged in
a matter of days with almost no follow-up, even though he was known to be vio-
lent.
Carol Ann Campbell, Mentally Ill Could Be Forced into Treatment: State Studies Outpatient
Idea, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 15, 1999, at 15, available at 1999 WL
100377526.
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2. Procedural Due Process
Although Kendra's Law provides important procedural safeguards
that minimize the erroneous deprivation of liberty, it is procedurally
deficient in a number of respects.
The purpose of procedural due process analysis is "to determine
whether a state has provided adequate procedures to minimize effi-
ciently the risk of arbitrary or erroneous deprivations of life, liberty, or
property."178 In Matthews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court outlined the
factors that must be considered, as required by procedural due proc-
ess, when a liberty interest is at stake.
79
First, [the court must consider] the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used[; third, the] value ... of addi-
tional or substitute... safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the ... fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural [safeguards] would entail.
180
This balancing test requires that the procedural protections afforded
correspond to the level of infringement on liberty that the state action
poses.'8' Consistent with the sliding scale approach of the Matthews
balancing test, all states have granted fewer procedural protections to
outpatients than to inpatients, due to the lower restriction on liberty
involved in outpatient treatment. 2
Kendra's Law provides important procedural due process protec-
tions, which are crucial to lessening the probability of an erroneous
deprivation of liberty. Individuals subject to a hearing are entitled to
legal representation from MHLS or from a private attorney at all
stages of the proceeding.8 3 Critics from the Mental Health Associa-
178 Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 336 (5th Cir. 1984).
179 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (noting that procedural due process constrains go%-
ernmental decisions that deprive people of liberty interests).
180 Id. at 335.
1 See Susan Stefan, Preventive Commitment. The Concept and Its Pitfalls, 11 MENTAL &
PHYsIcAL DIsABILTY L. REP. 288, 292 (1987) ("The greater the infringement of liberty
represented by the state action, the more procedural protections must be afforded to
an individual before he may be subjected to the action.").
182 See id. ("[S] tates vary greatly in the level of procedural protections they grant to
a person subject to commitment. ). Stefan notes that Georgia comes closest to
giving equivalent protections, with North Carolina, offering little more than notice and
a hearing by ajudge, giving the least procedural protections. Id. North Carolina may
justify its procedural deficiency by lack of enforcement mechanisms. Id.; see also supra
notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina's lack of coercion in its
statutory commitment scheme).
183 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.60(g) (McKinney Supp. 2001) ("The subject of
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tion, a statewide advocacy group for the mentally ill, expressed con-
cern that MHLS is underfunded and is often unable to provide attor-
neys."' Assistant Attorney General Brian Stettin, who drafted the law,
has stated, however, that hearings would be delayed until an MHLS
lawyer is available.'
Other due process protections required by Kendra's Law include
the requirement that the examining physician testify as to the ration-
ale supporting the need for AOT."3 The patient has the right to cross-
examine the physician, or any other adverse witnesses, as well as to call
her own witnesses and present any other admissible evidence for the
court's consideration. 7 The law also requires that written notice of
the hearing be served on the subject of the petition, the subject's
nearest known relative, the MHLS, the AOT program coordinator ap-
pointed by OMH, any health care agent appointed by the subject in a
health care proxy, and the appropriate AOT mental health director.' g
In addition, the law specifies a method of notice-notice must be writ-
ten and given personally or by mail.'
Despite these provisions, Kendra's Law still raises some procedural
concerns. First, the law requires that a court hearing must take place
within three days of the filing of the petition.'" Attorneys from MHLS
have expressed concern that this leaves insufficient time for counsel to
prepare, or even to become familiar with their client's case histories"
the petition shall have the right to be represented by the mental hygiene legal service,
or other counsel at the expense of the subject of the petition, at all stages of a proceed-
ing .. .")
See Spencer, supra note 172 ("[Platients faced with ... possible confinement
should have the same right to assigned counsel as defendants in criminal proceed-
ings.").
1. See id. ("We're just not going to have a hearing unless the patient has a law-
y'er.").
Sr N.Y. MENTAL HYG. L-W § 9.60(h) (2) (McKinney Supp. 2001) ("The court
shall not order assisted outpatient treatment unless an examining physician, who has
personally examined the subject of the petition within the time period commencing
ten days before the filing of the petition, testifies in person at the hearing.").
I7Id. § 9.60 (h) (5).
'" So, id. § 9.29 (McKinney 1996) (outlining the notice requirements for involun-
tary admission); id. § 9.60(f) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (same).
"' See id. § 9.60(f) ("The petitioner shall cause written notice of the petition to be
given to the subject of the petition and a copy thereof shall be given personally or by
mail to the persons listed in section 9.29 of this article.... .").
1', See id. § 9.60(h)(1) ("Upon receipt by the court of the petition submit-
ted ... the court shall fix the date for a hearing at a time not later than three days
from the date such petition is received by the court.... ").
01 SepYael Schacher, Courts, Laur;ers Are Gearing Up to Handle Kendra's Law Hearings,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 30, 1999, at 1 ("[T]he speed with which the hearings must take place
209
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Since the mentally ill affected by the law are not within a hospital set-
ting, they may be harder for MHLS to reach, contributing to the prob-
lem of there being "insufficient time for proper advocacy." "2 Second,
the treatment plan may be presented at the time of the hearing or
even three business days afterwards (if the petitioner is not a mental
health or AOT program director). 93 This does not allow sufficient
time for the patient's attorney to rebut the plan. Finally, the patient
may be committed for up to twenty-four hours and ordered to un-
dergo a psychiatric evaluation if the patient refused to do so prior to
the hearing. 94 Yet, there is no provision for attorneys' fees or for ex-
perts' fees, thus allowing no opportunity to rebut the findings of such
an involuntary examination. Although the court is unlikely to find
these issues to be so grave as to vitiate the law's constitutionality, some
procedural modifications ought to be considered.
Take, for example, the speed with which the hearings must take
place. If the attorneys are not given adequate time to prepare a case
or if, as is the reality in some instances, they cannot even locate their
clients, then the right to a hearing and the right to an attorney is, to
that extent, diminished. When the Matthews balancing test is applied
under these circumstances, there may be some risk of erroneous dep-
rivation of liberty. The value of additional safeguards, such as the
provision of more hearing preparation time, would be beneficial.
Furthermore, in considering the government's interests, it should not
entail a substantial administrative or financial burden to extend the
period between the filing of the petition and the date of the hearing.
Thus, this additional safeguard would further insulate Kendra's Law
from claims of unconstitutionality under a Matthews analysis.
3. Equal Protection
Under a rational basis standard of review, Kendra's Law likely sat-
isfies the Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause states
that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 95 A rational basis standard of review is
used primarily for economic classifications and classifications dealing
with general social welfare regulations. A rational basis standard of
review attaches a presumption of validity to the reasonableness of the
may present due process concerns ... ").
1. Id.
193 See Kendra 's Law: The Process, supra note 23, at 5.
194 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(h) (3) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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classification, placing the burden on the party challenging its legiti-
macy. Under strict scrutiny review, the burdens are reversed and the
state must demonstrate that the classification is the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling state interest.
Strict scrutiny review is used only when a classification threatens a
fundamental right or disadvantages a "suspect" class. If the least re-
strictive means are not used and the statute is determined to be over-
inclusive, then the statute is considered to be motivated by bias and is
declared unconstitutional. If the mentally ill were characterized as a
suspect class, then the states' commitment schemes would be subject
to a more critical review. The states would be compelled to develop
and fund community-based alternatives. If the mentally ill are not af-
forded suspect class protection, however, then the states' commitment
schemes would be considered constitutional if there were a mere ra-
tional relation between means and ends, and the states would be un-
der no obligation to provide less restrictive alternatives of treatment.
The mentally ill can arguably be characterized as a suspect class in
and of themselves or as a class of individuals whose status correlates
with poverty.' " It is unlikely, however, that the Court would regard
either the mentally ill or the indigent as suspect classes. The Court
refused to give heightened scrutiny to the mentally retarded in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, where the issue was whether a city
ordinance that required the mentally retarded to obtain special per-
mits for group homes violated equal protection."' Although the
Court invalidated the ordinance, it did so under a rational basis level
of scrutiny. In addition, the Court refused to apply a strict level of
scrutiny to wealth classifications in San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, where the issue addressed was disparate school fund-
ing in the poorest property districts9
Although there is a strong argument to be made that the mentally
ill do meet the criteria of a suspect class and that classifications affect-
1, See Mapper, supra note 22, at 828 (arguing that "[w]hile mental illness certainly
does affect the middle and upper classes, these individuals... often have the family
support and the financial support to make use of private, non-institutionalized alterna-
tives. Those who are committed, as well as candidates for civil commitment, tend to
be, however, the poorest of the poor....").
P,7 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) ("[The equal protection standard] ... affords gov-
ernment the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed to assist the retarded
in realizing their full potential, and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that
burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner.").1- 411 U.S. 1, 2 (1973) (holding that "insofar as the financing system disadvan-
tages those who, disregarding their individual income characteristics, reside in com-
paratively poor school districts, the resulting class cannot be said to be suspect").
1211
1212 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVEW [Vol. 149:1181
ing them should be viewed with suspicion, it is improbable that this
will be the case under the current Court's regime.') Therefore, Ken-
dra's Law likely does not violate equal protection, as analyzed under a
rational relation basis standard of review. The ends and the means
used to achieve them are at least rationally related. The classification
made under Kendra's Law can be sustained under this minimal stan-
dard of review, where the law is given a presumption of validity and
the courts defer to the legislature, reluctant to reverse its judgment.
Even if there is an imperfect fit and Kendra's Law is overinclusive, as
North Carolina's law is, or does not provide the least restrictive alter-
native, it still will most likely withstand rational basis scrutiny.i°°
B. State Constitutional Analysis
New York's constitution parallels the U.S. Constitution, providing
that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." 0 The due process clause has been interpreted at
common law as granting "[elvery human being of adult years and
sound mind... [the] right to determine what shall be done with his
own body."
20 2
In In re Storar, the patient was a fifty-two-year old, severely mentally
retarded man with terminal cancer of the bladder. °  The patient's
mother, who was also his legal guardian, refused to consent to blood
transfusions that would prolong his life because she felt that the trans-
fusions would extend his discomfort and be against his wishes if he
were competent.2°4 The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Divi-
sion decision and held that as the subject was incompetent to refuse
such treatment, the application by his mother to discontinue treat-
19 See Kapper, supra note 22, at 822-26 (referring to political powerlessness, segre-
gation, discrimination, and the immutability of mental illness as among the obstacles
facing the mentally ill that necessitate heightened scrutiny).
See In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (rejecting the equal pro-
tection challenge and finding that disparate treatment of psychiatric outpatients is
warranted); see also infra notes 283-87 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning
of the court in In re Urcuyo).
201 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
202 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled on
other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). In this case, the court went
so far as to categorize the violation of the patient's rights as trespass. Id.
203 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981) (noting that the patient had no reasonable chance of
recovery).
204 Id. at 66.
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ment should have been denied.20 ' The court, however, held that the
law has "consistently support[ed] the right of the competent adult to
make his own decision by imposing civil liability on those who per-
form medical treatment without consent, although the treatment may
be beneficial or even necessary to preserve the patient's life."2 6 In
other words, the court acknowledged the patient's right to determine
his own course of medical treatment.
2 07
In light of Stora, the courts have interpreted the due process
clause of the state constitution as affording to involuntarily committed
mental patients the fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic medica-
tion.4"' In Rivers v. Katz, involuntarily committed mental patients
sought a declaratory judgment concerning their common law and
constitutional right to refuse medication .2  The court found a quali-
fied fundamental right to reject medical treatment: "the right to re-
ject treatment with antipsychotic medication is not absolute and un-
der certain circumstances may have to yield to compelling State
interests."2' '
In only two circumstances did the court find that the State's inter-
ests outweighed the patient's right to refuse treatment. First, the State
may exercise its police power to administer medication where the pa-
tient poses a danger to himself or society."' In the second instance,
the State may exercise its parens patriae authority to forcibly administer
medication when the patient is incompetent to make a decision con-
cerning treatment.212 Kendra's Law does not have a dangerousness
requiremente'" tojustify use of the police power, nor does it have a re-
quirement that the patient be incompetent to make decisions regard-
See id. (noting that the orders of the lower courts were stayed and the treat-
ments continued pending appeals to that court).
-" Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
So,,7 id. (holding that the "current law identifies the patient's right to determine
the course of his own medical treatment as paramount to what might otherwise be the
doctor's obligation to provide needed medical care").
See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (addressing whether and under
what circumstances the State may forcibly administer such medication).
See id. (elaborating on these claims).
Id. at 343.
AI Id.
-1U See id. ("'[T]he sine qua non for the state's use ... of mind-affecting drugs is a
determination that the individual to whom the drugs are to be administered lacks the
capacity to decide for himself whether he should take the drugs.'" (quoting Rogers v.
Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Cuesnongle v. Ra-
mos, 835 F.2d 1486 (1st Cir. 1987))).
1 See supra notes 45-47, 170-71 and accompanying text (discussing the require-
ment, for outpatient commitment under Kendra's Law).
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ing treatment to justify use of the parens patriae power.'14 Further-
more, the law specifies that "[t] he determination by a court that a pa-
dent is in need of assisted outpatient treatment commitment under
this section shall not be construed as or deemed to be a determina-
tion that such patient is incapacitated."
2 1
1
On its face, it appears that Kendra's Law permits a constitutional
violation in that it has the potential to compel one to take medica-
tion.2 6 Kendra's Law, however, does not authorize forced medication
as an enforcement mechanism. 21' Noncompliance with medication is
merely one factor considered by a physician in reaching a clinical de-
termination regarding involuntary inpatient admission.2 "' Although it
is arguable that a patient may feel compelled to take medication out
of fear that noncompliance will lead to inpatient commitment, the law
technically does not authorize forced medication.I 9 In theory, the pa-
tient may refuse treatment, but in actuality the patient may feel forced
to comply. Still, there is a substantial difference between feeling
compelled and actually being compelled, and the law cannot be said
to violate the constitution in this respect.
2 °
214 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting that impaired decisionmaking
is not a prerequisite to administering involuntary outpatient treatment).
25 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(o) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
26 Opponents argue that Kendra's Law is unconstitutional because it authorizes
involuntary medication without requiring a finding of incompetence or an emergency
situation. Gutterman, supra note 48, at 2435. Kendra's Law, however, does not author-
ize involuntary medication at all. The patient must accept the treatment. See supra
notes 162-63 and accompanying text (adding that in practice, however, the patient may
have little choice in deciding whether or not to comply).
217 A recipient's failure to comply with an order for AOT is not grounds for invol-
untary civil commitment or contempt of court. Kendra's Law: The Process, supra note
23, at 7. However, any refusal of the individual to take prescribed medication, or the
failure of a test to determine either medication compliance or alcohol or drug use,
may be considered by the physician in reaching a clinical determination regarding in-
voluntary admission. Id.
218 Id.
219 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
220 The argument can be made that this is a form of soft compulsion, in that the
patient may feel forced to comply for fear of the indirect consequences. But this type
of compulsion is not all that foreign to the American legal system. For example, al-
though no one is ever "forced" to incriminate themselves in order to exercise their
Fifth Amendment rights they still must, in open court, declare that they decline to an-
swer questions that may incriminate them. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No per-
son.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... .").
In so doing, the declarants have implicitly incriminated themselves. Even so, being
forced to verbally and explicitly "take the Fifth" is not considered self-incrimination
through state compulsion, regardless of what the judge and jury are likely to do in re-
sponse to this kind of constitutional exercise. Indirect penalties for failure to self-
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It is also arguable that Kendra's Law violates the right to deter-
mine one's own course of treatment that was recognized in Storar."2 '
However, the patient or the patient's relative, close friend, or other
concerned individual is invited to participate in the development of
the treatment plan. '2 Furthermore, as in the case of prescribed medi-
cation, the patient is not compelled to comply with treatment, but the
individual must at least accept the ordered treatment plan.2" Again,
noncompliance with the treatment plan may be considered as a factor
in making a clinical determination about the need for inpatient
treatment, but the individual is not technically forced to comply.
22 4
Therefore, the fine line between constitutional and unconstitutional
has not been crossed.
III. POLICY RATIONALE
A. Justificationsfor Kendra's Law
As discussed throughout this Comment, the two main justifica-
tions for AOT lie in the State's police power and the parens patriae
power. The police power justifies AOT to protect society from violent
acts that mentally ill individuals, such as Andrew Goldstein, sometimes
commit after failing to take much-needed medication. The parens pa-
triae power, an essentially paternalistic justification, is based on the ra-
tionale that the State may care for those who are unable to care for
themselves. Both justifications rest on the fact that many mentally
ill patients lack insight into their disease and refuse to take their
medication because they deny their sickness.2 It is this denial of
mental illness that makes compliance unlikely when treatment is vol-
untary."', Kendra's Law attempts to compel compliance with treat-
medicate cannot be considered any worse.
•. See In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 (N.Y. 1981) (noting that one's right to deter-
mine one's medical treatment is paramount to a doctor's obligation to provide neces-
sary care).
V-. See Office of Counsel for the New York State Office of Mental Health, supra note
117 roviding an overview of AOT provisions).
Kendra's Law: The Process, supra note 23, at 6.
I ld. at 7.
See E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz, A Right to Mental Illness?, N.Y. POST, May
28, 1999, at 35 ("They refuse [to take their medication] because their illness impairs
their thinking and they do not think they are sick. They have impaired awareness of
their illness."); see also supra note 9 (explaining that such a lack of insight "usually
manifests itself as belligerency" towards treatment).
A court which does not issue an order that a mentally ill person is to obtain
some type of treatment will have to concern itself with whether the person will
1215
1216 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:1181
ment regimens using the force of law (although, as discussed above,
the statute does not authorize forced medication) .227
Despite its lack of dangerousness and impaired decisionmaking
requirements, the statute is also narrowly tailored to reach appropri-
228ate candidates for AOT. Omission of these requirements lowers the
standard one must attain to be eligible for AOT. This was a legislative
choice made to bring more individuals within the scope of the law.
Yet, other criteria reduce the possibility that the statute will be overin-
clusive and affect individuals who are not appropriate candidates for
220,AOT. In addition, procedural safeguards are built into the law that
lower the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.2' However, in-
creasing the length of time between the filing of the petition and the
date of the hearing would be helpful to lower this risk even further,
and Kendra's Law should be amended to implement this suggestion!"
Critics of Kendra's Law argue that the statute has the potential to
criminalize patients and to infringe impermissibly on their liberty.
2
This argument reflects the "ongoing clash between medical paternal-
ism and individual autonomy."2 From another perspective, however,
liberty can actually be increased by outpatient commitment for a cer-
tain class of individuals who cannot function effectively in the com-
munity without such treatment:
To define liberty for such individuals as the "right to be free from inter-
voluntarily come to a clinic or mental health center for the medication pre-
scribed for him and whether the patient's family, "though nodding repeatedly
that they want 'whatever is best,' will unconsciously undercut the patient's at-
tempts at community survival."
Wilkinson, supra note 19, at 1341 (quoting David L. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill" Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L.
REv. 1107, 1137 (1972)).
27 See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text (discussing the right to refuse
treatment).
228 See supra notes 46, 171 and accompanying text (recognizing that the law reaches
those who face the risk of deterioration); supra note 40 and accompanying text (rec-
ognizing that the law does not require patients to have impaired decisionmaking abil-
ity). See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text (discussing the balance sought
between respecting the individual's liberty and honoring the demands of society).
23 See supra note 175.
231 See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the various procedural safeguards under Ken-
dra's Law).
2 See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural defi-
ciencies of Kendra's Law).
233 Lara Jakes, Family Applauds Signing of 'Kendra's Law, TIMES UNION (Albany,
N.Y.), Aug. 28, 1999, at Al.
234 Wisor, supra note 60, at 168.
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ference" is to guarantee that they will continue without the treatment
needed to make them truly integrated members of the community.
Thus, preventive commitment places its faith in the ability of medical
professionals to break the revolving door cycle through treatment of
those who, to their detriment, have consistently refused to accept it.
This is classic paternalism-restrictions on liberty are justified on the
grounds that they are in the patients' best interests and will, in the end,
further their ultimate freedom.23
Thus, outpatient commitment can ultimately free patients by liberat-
ing them from their illnesses.
Liberty is also enhanced by outpatient commitment in the sense
that it prevents unnecessary inpatient commitments. Mental health
professionals often prescribe treatment based on what is available,
rather than on what is appropriate.238 In addition, "legal and medical
liability have encouraged mental health professionals to err on the
side of overcommitment."237 Finally, judges may feel uncomfortable
releasing mentally ill individuals into the community for fear of the
harm that those individuals may later cause.2  Prior to the passage of
Kendra's Law, not only did New York lack any statute providing for
outpatient commitment, but it was also the only state that had a stat-
ute specifically prohibiting it.239 With the signing of Kendra's Law,
New York is now able to offer an alternative treatment that is less re-
strictive than inpatient commitment. Judges who previously would
have ordered inpatient treatment and clinicians who would have rec-
ommended it now have another option that is much less restrictive.
B. Potential Barriers
Critics of outpatient commitment argue that reclassifying the
mentally ill as outpatients will not break the cycle of the "revolving
door" unless programs are actually implemented that adhere to the
State's provisions to create outpatient facilities and services.2 ° Fund-
ing has always been a key problem in community mental health
care.21 If adequate programs and services are not provided, then the
reality of outpatient commitment bears no relation to the stated goals
2 Id.
Klapper, supra note 22, at 761.
,1 Id. at 765.
23 Id. at 765 n.101.
Supra text accompanying note 49.
28' Stefan, supra note 181, at 296.
Id.
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of outpatient commitment.24 With the passage of Kendra's Law, the
State's mental health system is taking on an added financial burden as
the statute broadens the universe of people subject to commitment.
The system must be capable of absorbing the additional committees,
which necessitates more funding for extra lawyers, mental health pro-
fessionals, expert witnesses, and treatment programs. Kendra's Law
stipulates that the OMH provide grants to counties to enable them to
assist mentally ill people in receiving medication as they transition
from hospitals or correctional facilities to the community while they
are applying for Medicaid.2 43 A $32-million spending program known
as the Medication Grant Program has been approved to implement
this stipulation.2 4' Additionally, a $125-million spending plan that in-
cludes provisions for more case managers and clinicians, as well as
provisions for supervised housing units offering mental health serv-
245ices, has been passed. It remains to be seen whether these budget-
ary provisions will prove sufficient to implement Kendra's Law.
An additional barrier exists if there are no provisions made to ease
the increased burden on the legal system that will result from the
need for more lawyers and expert witnesses, as required by the law.
For the 2000-2001 fiscal year judiciary budget, only $500,000 was allo-
246cated towards the implementation of Kendra's Law. As Kendra's
Law guarantees free legal representation from MHLS at all stages of
the commitment hearing, the system could easily become overbur-
dened as the demand for lawyers increases.247
The burden on the legal system could also appear if renewal peti-
tions flood the courts. Court orders for AOT only last for six months
242 Id.
243 Kendra's Law: New York's Assisted Outpatient Treatment Law, supra note 156, at 3.
The Medication Grant Program, established by Kendra's Law, provides grants for the
cost of medications and other services for individuals with mental illnesses moving to
the community from local jails, state prisons, or hospitals. Eligibility is limited to indi-
viduals with pending Medicaid applications, if they apply within seven days of release
or discharge. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, Kendra's Law: A Look at AOT's First
Year, at http://www.omh.state.ny.us/omhweb/omhq/ql200/kendra.htm (last visited
Dec. 21, 2000).
244 See supra note 156 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Medication
Grant Program.
24 See supra note 157 and accompanying text for a discussion of the provisions
made for Kendra's Law in the 2001-2002 New York State Executive Budget.
246 John Caher, Judiciary Gets Boost in Budget of 6 Percent; Lawmakers Even Added to the
Court's Proposa N.Y. L.J., May 9, 2000, at 1.
247 Kendra's Law: The Process, supra note 23, at 5.
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and may be renewed in one year increments. 25 Critics also note that
this bureaucratic process could potentially divert funds and attention
away from treatment programs. Yet, others disagree and note that
outpatient hearings are less expensive and less adversarial than civil
commitment trials, which will allow for more compromise, negotia-
tion, and opportunity to customize treatment plans.20
One final barrier to the success of Kendra's Law involves potential
practical problems. For example, North Carolina's experience indi-
cated that issues, such as lack of transportation to the mental health
center or lack of reminders about appointments, reduced compliance
with outpatient treatment.251 The success of outpatient treatment in
North Carolina depended on the commitment and the attitudes of
the mental health staff.252 North Carolina dedicated $2200 to $2300
each year per outpatient, which permitted case managers to "bring
treatment to the client rather than requiring the client to come to a
mental health center to be treated."25' If New York wants to be as suc-
cessful as North Carolina, the legislature must be ready to make a fi-
nancial commitment and the staffs at the mental health centers must
be fully dedicated.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND CASE LAW
Few decisions have been reported since the enactment of Ken-
dra's Law. The few cases reported under the statute involve statutory
interpretation and challenges to constitutionality. The first reported
Kendra's Law decision, In re Arden Hill Hospital, involved the costs of
implementing a treatment plan.24 The court held that costs not cov-
ered by insurance, Medicaid, or otherwise "are to be borne by the lo-
cal government through the duties imposed by this law on the direc-
tor of community services."O
2' Id. at 7.
Schacher, supra note 191.
I5J d.
kA Wilkinson, supra note 19, at 1344.
"-,1Z See id. (noting that mental health centers in North Carolina were willing and
able to provide treatment to outpatient-committed clients).
" Id.
' 703 N.Y.S.2d 902 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
Id. at 907. The court also stated, however, that under certain circumstances the
respondent or petitioner should be responsible for the costs: "Certainly if the respon-
dent has financial resources, whether it be through employment or funds established
by trust or the proceeds of a lawsuit, it would appear that the respondent should be
responsible for the costs of his or her own treatment and for the costs of obtaining that
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The second case to arise under Kendra's Law, In re Sullivan, dem-
onstrates that the specificity in pleading required under Kendra's Law
is "not to be taken lightly" and that the specificity requirements will
not be viewed "as simply technical pleading requirements."25 The
court dismissed a petition filed pursuant to Kendra's Law because the
physician's supporting affidavit failed to plead sufficient facts to dem-
onstrate that the respondent met the criteria for AOT.257 Instead, the
physician's affidavit made conclusory statements without any support-
ing documentation. A supplemental affirmation was submitted,
which, although it contained specific facts that demonstrated the re-
spondent's violent propensity, was also found insufficient, because it
was neither based upon the physician's personal knowledge nor was
the source of the information identified.2 Under Kendra's Law, the
court noted that the pleading sufficiency requirements not only pro-
tect due process rights, but also allow the respondent to adequately
prepare a defense259 Furthermore, the court pronounced that the
constitutional safeguards attach to the petition itself, and not just to
the hearing, in order to permit the court to make an informed deci-
sion.
260
In a similar case involving the same physician, In re Sullivan, the
court denied the patient's motion to dismiss a physician's petition
filed pursuant to Kendra's Law, holding that the physician-patient
evidentiary privilege did not prevent a treating physician from submit-
261ting testimony or an affidavit in support of a petition. In this case,
treatment." Id. at 906. Yet, this responsibility arises not only by virtue of being the pe-
titioner, but by law independent of the statute that imposes a legal responsibility on
the person for the respondent, such as where the petitioner is the spouse or parent of
the respondent. Id. at 907.
256 710 N.Y.S.2d 855, 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
257 Id. at 857 ("Clearly, these allegations, which are nothing more than conclusions,
not facts, are insufficient."). But see In re Sarkis (Robinson), N.Y. LJ., Aug. 18, 2000, at
29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2000) (denying a patient's motion to dismiss for alleged lack
of specificity, stating that "Dr. Theventhiran's affirmation, predicated on an inartfully-
pleaded combination of personal knowledge (e.g., 'clinical observations') and infor-
mation and belief (e.g., respondent's medical 'records'), may be deemed legally suffi-
cient to cure any perceived defects in the underlying petition").
258 In re Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
29 Id. at 856.
260 Id.
261 710 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding that the physician-patient evi-
dentiary privilege only protects confidential communications, but does not protect
facts); see also Amin v. Rose F., N.Y. LJ., Dec. 7, 2000, at 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 6, 2000)
("[I]t is clear that the Legislature intended and desired for the subject's treating psy-
chiatrist to be intimately involved with the various aspects of assisted outpatient treat-
ment, and thereby implicitly waived the physician-patient privilege for the purposes of
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the testifying physician was also the respondent's treating psychiatrist,
prompting the respondent to claim the physician-patient privilege to
prevent the physician from submitting testimony in support of the pe-
tition . ' The court held, however, that the privilege is not absolute-
it only protects confidential communications, with the burden of
proof lying with the party claiming the privilege."' Additionally, the
court stated that nothing in Kendra's Law prevents a treating
physician from being the examining physician, as long as she is not
the petitioner.'"
Ii re Dailey was a case of statutory interpretation challenging the
meaning of the provision of the statute that requires at least two hos-
pitalizations within the preceding thirty-six month period.26' The two
issues presented were: (1) whether the period of hospitalization im-
mediately prior to the proceeding was to be counted towards the
statutory requirement of at least two hospitalizations, and (2) whether
that period of hospitalization was to be added to the required thirty-
six months.' 6 The court concluded, after a reading of the legislative
history coupled with this section of the statute, that "the section seeks
only to expand the number of months which a petitioner can look
back to thirty-six months prior to the current hospitalization and does
not exclude the acts of non-compliance with treatment and the cur-
rent hospitalization itself from consideration for an AOT order."
267
Finally, the most recent court decisions to arise under Kendra's
Law have addressed the constitutional challenges to the law.2'6 The In
re Urcuyo court rejected the patients' claim that, absent a requirement
that a court find by "clear and convincing" evidence that a patient
lacks the capacity to make a reasoned treatment decision, Kendra's
Law violates the due process clause of the New York State Constitu-
assisted outpatient treatment.").
!.Q In re Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
Id.
Id. at 806.
713 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
It d. at 662-63.
L,0 Id. at 663; see also In re Sarkis (Robinson), N.Y. L.J., Aug. 18, 2000, at 25 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2000) (holding that the patient's current hospitalization may be in-
cluded as among the two hospitalizations required within the preceding thirty-six
month period). The In re Dailey court also notes a recent proposal in the New York
State Senate, S. 7814, 223d Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1999), which, in part, seeks to clarify
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.60(c) (4) (1) (McKinney Supp. 2001). 713 N.Y.S.2d at 663
n.3.
See In re Martin, N.Y. L.J.,Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.Jan. 8, 2001) (stating
the respondent's challenge to Kendra's Law as a violation of constitutional due process
protections); In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (same).
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don, the common law of New York State, and the equal protection
clauses of the NewYork State and U.S. Constitutions. 9
Respondents relied on Rivers v. Katz70 in support of their conten-
tion that the due process clause of the New York State Constitution
"require [s] a finding of incapacity before the court can order a course
of medical treatment.",71 The court in Rivers held that an involuntarily
committed psychiatric patient could not be forcibly medicated against
her will absent ajudicial determination that she lacked the mental ca-
272
pacity to make treatment decisions. As the In re Urcuyo court ex-
plained, however, unlike patients in Rivers hearings, "Kendra's Law
contemplates treatment of patients who .... do not require the forci-
ble administration of medication" and who have the capacity to make
treatment decisions, especially those patients who are in the hospital
facing imminent discharge.7 It is clear that this was the legislative in-
tent, as the statute provides for the active participation of the patient
274in the development of the treatment plan. Thus, "[t]he practical
result of requiring a lack of capacity component to be added to the
statutory scheme would be to eliminate the option of an Assisted Out-
patient Treatment order for many patients."
7 5
Respondents further argued that even though the statute does not
provide for the forcible administration of medication, a patient's right
to refuse medication is violated by the threat of "arrest upon non-
compliance with the plan."276 As the court explained, however, "'fail-
ure to comply with an [AOT] order shall not be grounds for involun-
tary civil commitment or a finding of contempt of court.'"2 77 Instead,
failure to comply with the treatment plan only "leads to the height-
ened scrutiny of physicians for a seventy-two hour evaluation period,
but only after a physician has determined that the patient may be in
269 In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
270 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
271 In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 867. For a discussion of Rivers, see also supra notes
208-12 and accompanying text.
272 Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343-44.
273 In re Urcuyo, 714 NYS.2d at 868. "In this court's experience presiding over
hearings pursuant to MHL 9.60 it has become clear that many of the subject-patients,
especially those that are still in the hospital and are to be imminently discharged, have
the capacity to make treatment decisions." Id. at 868 n.2.
See id. at 868 ("Kendra's Law envisions a process where a patient with capacity
actively participates in the planning of his or her own treatment plan.").
275 Id. at 868 n.2.
276 Id. at 869.
277 Id. (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(n) (McKinney Supp. 2001)).
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need of involuntary admission to a hospital." 78 Furthermore, this sev-
enty-two hour detention period was deemed to be a "reasonable re-
sponse to a patient's failure to comply with treatment when it is bal-
anced against the compelling state interests that are involved."279 The
State has a legitimate interest because once a court makes an AOT or-
der based on clear and convincing evidence, it has then been adjudi-
cated that failure to comply with the treatment plan is likely to make
2801the patient dangerous to herself or others. Under the State's parens
patriae and police powers, the State has a legitimate interest in protect-
ing the patient herself, as well as society, from the patient's dangerous
tendencies. ' The court further explained that the response is rea-
sonable because of precedents in case law and in the Mental Hygiene
Law that have "allowed physicians to consider a patient's conduct in
the community, including a history of relapses or deterioration, in de-
ciding dangerousness. 
"
182
The court in In re Urcuyo also rejected the patients' equal protec-
tion challenge. The patients argued that the state legislature had cre-
ated three classes of individuals who potentially may be deprived of
their fundamental right to control their treatment: alleged incapaci-
tated persons, who are "individuals subject to guardianship proceed-
ings pursuant to MHL article 81 ... , involuntary psychiatric inpa-
tients and psychiatric outpatients."2 3 These three classes, the patients
argued, were subject to disparate treatment not supported by any
compelling state interest. Specifically, the patients claimed that for
i x Id. at 870.
27, Id.
Id.
1 Id.
' Id. at 871. The cases the court cites for this proposition are Seltzer v. Hogue, 594
N.Y.S.2d 781 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that physicians could consider a patient's
behavior in the community after discharge in making a determination of
dangerousness), and In re Francis, 618 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (same), affd
663 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y. 1995). The court cites N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13(b)
(McKinney 1996) as precedent for the proposition that the seventy-two-hour detention
period is a reasonable response. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 966 (2d
Cir. 1983) (holding constitutional N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13(b)). Section 9.13(b)
provides that a voluntarily committed patient who gives written notice to the hospital
director of his desire to leave must be promptly released from the hospital, unless the
director reasonably believes the patient needs involuntary treatment. N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 9.13(b). In that instance, the patient may be detained for up to seventy-
two hours from the patient's written notice. During the seventy-two-hour period, the
director must have two physicians examine the patient and report their conclusions to
the director, who must then either release the patient or seek a court order authoriz-
ing involuntary retention. Id.
'1 3 In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
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the first two classes of individuals, "there must be a finding by clear
and convincing evidence [of incapacity] to mak[e] ... treatment deci-
sions," while for the third class (those targeted by Kendra's Law), "no
such finding is required by the statute."2 8  Rejecting the argument,
the court found that there is no equal protection violation, first, be-
cause individuals subject to AOT orders are not deprived of their fun-
damental right to refuse medical treatment and are only subject to a
"constitutionally acceptable procedure to ensure that the patient is
evaluated by a physician."2 8 Second, "assuming arguendo ... that the
abridgement of the patients [sic] fundamental right to refuse medical
treatment was involved," disparate treatment is warranted because, un-
like the other two categories of individuals, subjects of AOT are "likely
to decompensate and become dangerous again if they fail to follow
their treatment plans. Clearly, the state has a compelling interest in
taking measures to prevent these patients who pose such a high risk
from becoming a danger to the community and themselves. ''2"" Ken-
dra's Law, the court continued, is "narrowly tailored to achieve these
goals within the framework of the involuntary and emergency com-
mitment procedures of the Mental Hygiene Law."
28 7
In In re Martin, the court also rejected the patient's challenge that
Kendra's Law violates due process and equal protection, absent a find-
ing of incapacity to make reasoned treatment decisions, and the con-
tention that a patient subject to an outpatient treatment order who
fails to comply with the treatment plan "be afforded notice and an
opportunity to be heard prior to being arrested and detained for a 72-
hour observation period." 8
As in In re Urcuyo, the respondent in In re Martin relied on Rivers v.
Katz28 in support of the claim that the due process clauses of the New
York State and U.S. Constitutions require a specific finding that the
patient lacks capacity to make reasoned decisions about treatment. ;" '"
The court disposed of this argument in the same manner it did in In re
Urcuyo, but added an additional element.29' The court stated that re-
284 Id.
28 Id. at 873.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 N.Y. LJ.,Jan. 9,2001, at31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.Jan. 8,2001).
289 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
M In re Martin, supra note 288.
291 See supra notes 270-82 and accompanying text (explaining that such an argu-
ment makes AOT impractical and that the short-term detention permitted was reason-
able).
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quiring a finding that the patient is unlikely to participate voluntarily
in treatment in the context of AOT is analogous to requiring a finding
of lack of capacity in the context of the forcible administration of
medication because "the finding is sufficient to justify the less onerous
restrictions on the patient's freedom."29"
The court also rejected the patient's claim that the patient must
be afforded notice and opportunity to be heard prior to arrest and
seventy-two-hour detainment for failing to comply with a treatment
plan or, in other words, that "only a court may order such confine-
ment or detention, rather than a physician, as set forth in the stat-
ute." " The court rejected this claim based on the fact that the statute
requires a judicial finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
patient will pose a danger to himself or others if he fails to comply
with treatment, and that the statute does not provide for "automatic"
confinement upon failure to comply with the treatment plan.Y The
patient also "contend[ed] that the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and its New York State constitutional counterpart
authorize the seizure and detention of an individual only where there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the person seized is danger-
ous."', The court stated that it believed that a physician's clinical
judgment as set forth in the statute meets this "probable cause" stan-
dard, especially in light of the fact that it is well established in the law
that this standard is satisfied by a police officer's reasonable belief that
a psychiatric examination is necessary.2 The court also went on to say
that due process does not require an additional hearing prior to con-
finement where "the existence of a potential emergency makes such a
prior hearing impracticable" and that a "'post-deprivation' remedy
provides adequate due process in such instances."297
Respondent's equal protection claim was also rejected by the In re
Martin court. The patient alleged that a comparable statute, Criminal
Procedure Law section 330.20, provides for notice and opportunity to
be heard prior to reconfinement in the case of criminal defendants
who have been acquitted on the grounds of insanity.2 9 The crucial
In re Martin, supra note 288.
~'Id.
'~Id.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
See id. ("Surely, if Fourth Amendment standards are satisfied by the reasonable
belief of a police officer, the clinical judgment of a physician similarly satisfies those
standards.").
Id.
SId.
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difference is that under that law, the criminal defendant would have
been originally released only upon a determination that the defen-
dant "no longer has a dangerous mental disorder and is no longer
mentally ill," in contrast to the situation of a patient under Kendra's
Law, who has been determined, based on clear and convincing evi-
dence, to be mentally ill.2 The court found this to be a rational basis
for the distinctive treatment and found no equal protection viola-
tion."°° The court went on to praise the law as a solution to the "seri-
ous void in New York's system of caring for the mentally ill" and fur-
ther stated that
Kendra's Law is a carefully crafted, well drawn and narrowly tailored en-
actment specifically directed toward the solution of serious problems
faced by society and by mentally ill persons. The statute is mindful of-
indeed solicitous toward-the civil liberties of the patients, while protect-
ing the vital interest of society in the safety of its citizens.
3 0
1
Despite these positive judicial statements, it is too soon to tell
whether Kendra's Law, as applied, will be regarded as a success or
failure. As of yet, it is "neither a boon nor a bust.""0 2 The courts have
applied its provisions seriously, with conscious awareness of the incor-
porated due process protections.Y3 In a recent open forum at the As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York, the general consensus
was that Kendra's Law "has been a boon to those who need treat-
ment "3 0 4 The panel of experts strongly disagreed, however, about the
legality of the increasing number of court orders for AOT, especially
in New York City.30 The two major concerns emerging from the panel
discussion were: (1) that "court orders could be used to ration care in
New York City, which has a much higher ratio of court orders to vol-
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Soo Id.
$01 Id.
302 Susan L. Pollet, Has Kendra s Law Been a Boon ora Bust2, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 23, 2000,
at 1.
303 Thus far, the courts have not abused their authority to order AOT. During the
law's first 14 months, only 512 AOT orders were given, out of 3169 individuals evalu-
ated. Laura Parker, N. Law Breaks Grounds in Court-Ordered Care, USA TODAY, Feb. 12,
2001, at 7A. Of the individuals evaluated, 837 were provided with enhanced services,
but not court-ordered treatment, and 1308 were determined not to be in need of serv-
ices or treatment. Id.
34 Yael Schacher, Experts Disagree over the Success of Kendra's Law, N.Y. L.J., June 30,
2000, at 1.
305 See id. (stating that as of June 14, 2000, New York City accounted for 131
granted petitions out of a total of 163 petitions granted statewide).
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untary treatment agreements than any where else in the state,""'6 and
(2) that 'judges-who may be motivated more by protecting the pub-
lic rather than compelling patients to get needed treatment-may de-
cide to err on the side of caution." 7 Although these are legitimate
concerns, the success of Kendra's Law will likely depend more on the
level of financial commitment to involuntary outpatient programs and
the quality of services provided.
CONCLUSION
With the passage of Kendra's Law, New York sought to provide a
less restrictive alternative for treating the mentally ill. The law dem-
onstrates that the State's police power and parens patriae interests can
outweigh the abridgement of a patient's liberty interests. The State
has the authority, through the police power, to protect society from
danger. The State also has the power, through its parens patriae
authority, to care for those who are unable to care for themselves.
Kendra's Law has lowered the bar for bringing mentally ill individuals
within the mental health care system, but has done so in a manner
that selects only appropriate candidates for AOT.
Furthermore, the restriction on liberty that a Kendra's Law outpa-
tient faces must be weighed against that patient's eventual increase in
liberty and autonomy. Absent an outpatient alternative, the mentally
ill individual either would be free from any interference, but a pris-
oner of her own illness, or would be subject to inpatient commitment
in a system that gravitates to over-commitment when no other alterna-
tives are available. Outpatient commitment under Kendra's Law pro-
vides a third option that can free the mentally ill both from their ill-
nesses and from physical confinement.
Kendra's Law is sound under both federal and state constitutions.
Substantive due process requires balancing an individual's liberty and
autonomy interests against a compelling state interest. The State's ob-
jectives, including aiding individuals who need routine care to survive
in the community at large, while simultaneously protecting the public
from violent acts committed by those people who refuse to take their
medication, override the patient's individual liberty interest. Fur-
thermore, procedural safeguards make an unjust deprivation of liberty
less likely. Finally, the state constitutional and common law right to
--- Id. During the law's first 14 months, 415 out of 512 court orders for AOT were
in New York City. Parker, supra note 303.
3,7 Schacher, supra note 304.
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refuse medication is not violated because Kendra's Law does not strip
outpatients of this right.
For Kendra's Law to be implemented successfully, the legislature
must commit financially to making it work. Adequate funding is criti-
cal to ensure the availability of community treatment programs. A
court order for AOT is meaningless unless the resources are available
to implement it. It is also crucial that staffs at mental health centers
be dedicated to the programs. Only then will the goals of Kendra's
Law be realized.
* * * * * *
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